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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Should an insured motorist be denied 
uninsured motorist coverage when driving an owned motorcycle 
not listed on the policy when such exclusion is not part of 
state law? 
2. Do the policy definitions dealing with the 
subject exclusion exempt owned motorcycles to allow for 
uninsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured on 
such vehicle? 
3. In the event the subject exclusion is held to 
violate public policy, should the uninsured motorist 
benefits be reduced by earlier paid out no-fault benefits? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
(herafter "Bear River") brought this declaratory judgment 
action to determine the effectiveness of an exclusionary 
clause. 
Appellant Robert Wright (hereafter "Wright") was 
injured when involved in an accident between an uninsured 
motorist and himself. Mr. Wright was driving a motorcycle 
owned by him but not listed on his automobile policy. Mr. 
Wright's request for uninsured motorist benefits resulted in 
this declaratory action. 
Eoth parties filed motions for summary judgment 
concerning the validity of the exclusion. The lower court 
upheld the exclusion finding it did not violate public 
policy. 
FACTS 
The Accident. The accident occurred on April 28, 
1985, at the intersection of 2820 South 7200 West, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. Wright was driving a 1982 Honda motorcycle 
owned by him. The other driver, Mark Martinez, was stopped 
westbound at a stop sign. Wright had a yellow flashing 
light. (R.194, Depo of App., pp.19-20.) As Wright drove 
into the intersection, Mr. Martinez darted into the inter-
section, broadsiding Wright (R.194, Depo of App., p.20.) 
The Injuries. Wright was thrown across the 
intersection and over an adjoining chain link fence (R.194, 
Depo of App., p.28.) Wright was unconscious for about 
twenty-five minutes (R.914, Depo of App., p.28.) He 
suffered three broken ribs (R.194, Depo of App., p.36.) 
Contusions and injury to his left ankle, right knee and 
right hip resulted. (R.194, Depo of App., p.36.) A bruised 
kidney, collapsed lung and cervical injuries were also 
suffered. (R.194, Depo of App., p.37.) 
The Insurance. On or about January 15, 1985, 
(prior to the accident), Bear River issued to Wright an 
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automobile insurance policy. (R.2-3.) Said policy provided 
for uninsured motorist benefits up to $20,000 for bodily 
injury (R.4.) Said policy was in effect at the time of this 
accident. 
Bear River would be obligated to provide Wright 
uninsured motorist benefits but for the contested policy 
exclusion. (R.3.) That is, ther^ is no argument that 
uninsured motorist coverage is owing, but for the exclusion. 
The exclusionary clause excuses uninsured motorist protec-
tion when the insured is injured while occupying an 
automobile (other than an insured automobile) owned by the 
named insured (R.4.) 
Wright requested and received PIP (no-fault) 
benefits from Bear River for the injuries suffered in the 
accident. (R.194, Depo of App., p.53U) 
Counsel has stipulated and Bear River has asserted 
that for purposes of this action, Mark Martinez is assumed 
to be an uninsured motorist (R.4-5.) Wright has testified 
that Mark Martinez admitted to having no auto insurance at 
the time of the accident (R.194, Depo or App., p.23.) 
The Contested Court Decision. Bear River filed 
this declaratory judgment action pursuant to the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act (R.2.) The Honorable Timothy 
Hansen, ruled the subject exclusion did not violate public 
policy and held said exclusion enforceable. (R.186.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act 
mandates all Utah resident drivers maintain prescribed 
levels of automobile insurance. Included in this statutory 
mandate is uninsured motorist coverage. (Section 41-12-21 
and 41-12-21.1, U.C.A, as amended, See Exhibits 1 and 2.) 
This statutory mandate included specific exclusions which 
might appear in Utah automobile policies. 
The Utah uninsured motorist statute provides 
coverage to insured persons for bodily injury, sickness or 
death resulting from the acts of owners or operators of 
uninsured motor vehicles. 
The language of the Act clearly extends coverage 
to all insured persons — not vehicles I That is, uninsured 
motorist coverage extends to insured persons whether on 
foot, bike or car. 
Included in Bear River's automobile policy is an 
exclusion avoiding uninsured motorist coverage when the 
insured is injured while in an owned automobile other than 
the insured automobile. 
This exclusion conditions uninsured motorist 
coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident, not the 
injured person. This exclusion results in auto insurance 
coverage which does not meet the prescribed statutory 
minimum. The exclusion violates state law and is void. 
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Recognition of the subject exclusion requires 
treating uninsured motorist coverage as a risk policy* That 
is, an assumption must be made that by excluding uninsured 
owned automobiles, a carrier is reducing its risk and 
presumably its premiums. This is ap incorrect assumption. 
Utah uninsured motorist coverage follows the person not the 
vehicle. There is no effective way to base premiums on 
risk. The exclusion has no rational basis. 
Bear River should be prevented from setting off 
from uninsured motorist coverage amounts paid out under the 
Utah no-fault law. Such set-off would again result in 
automobile insurance coverage which does not meet the Utah 
statutory minimum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBJECT EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE CONTRADICTS 
THE MINIMUM COVERAGE SET FORTH BY THE UTAH 
STATUTES ON UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION 
The Utah Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act 
was written to cover the .insured automobile and insured 
driver. See, Section 41-12-21(b)(lj and (2), U.C.A., as 
amended 1953. (See Exhibit 1.) That statute specifically 
requires coverage for both the person and automobile. 
That statute also prescribes what exclusions and 
additions may be made to the minimum coverage. See 
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41-12-21 (f), (g) , (h) , (i) , (j) and (k) , U.C.A. as amended 
1953. (Exhibit 1.) 
The Utah uninsured motorist statute applicable at 
the time is found at Section 41-12-21.1, U.C.A, as amended 
1953. The coverage mandated by the law is clear and inclu-
sive. Unlike the liability statute, the uninsured motorist 
coverage extends to the insured person, not the insured 
automobile. It reads: 
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automo-
bile liability insurance policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability 
imposed by law for bodily injury or 
death or property damage suffered by any 
person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, 
shall be delivered, issued for delivery, 
or renewed in this state, with respect 
to any motor vehicle registered or 
principally garaged in this state, 
unless coverage is provided' in such 
policy or a supplement to it, in limits 
for bodily injury or death set forth in 
section 41-12-5, under provisions filed 
with and approved by the state insurance 
commission for the protection of persons 
insured thereunder who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners 
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles 
and hit-and-run motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness or disease, 
including death, resulting therefrom. 
The named insured shall have the right 
to reject such coverage, and unless the 
names insured requests such coverage in 
writing, such coverage need not be 
provided in a renewal policy or a 
supplement to it where the names insured 
had rejected the coverage in connection 
with a policy previously issued to him 
by the same insurer. [Emphasis added.] 
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The policy issued by Bear River included 
exclusions to the uninsured coverage. The subject exclusion 
is as follows: 
Exclusions: This [uninsured motorist] 
policy does not apply under Part IV: 
(a) to bodily injury t0 an insured 
while occupying an automobile 
(other than an insured automobile) 
owned by the named insured or a 
relative, or through being struck 
by such an automobile. (See 
Exhibit 3.) 
The exclusionary clause shifts the focus of the 
uninsured coverage from the insured person to the insured 
automobile. In so doing, the coverage provided by the 
subject policy falls well below th£ coverage mandated by 
Utah law. 
A. This Court Has Previously Rejected Attempts to Contra-
vene the Minimum Automobile Insurance Coverage Set Out 
by Statute. 
This court has consistently upheld the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act as providing the minimum 
coverage a Utah resident can purchase. The Court has struck 
down attempts by various insurance companies to provide less 
coverage than mandated by Utah law. 
In Coates v. American Economy Insurance Company, 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), this Court held an insured's 
automobile no-fault benefits was payable to that person 
while driving an owned motorcycle not listed on the policy. 
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This Court held the Utah no-fault law provided benefits for: 
Personal injuries sustained by the 
insured when injured in an accident in 
this state involving any motor vehicle. 
As in this action, Utah law called for the insur-
ance to follow the person, not the insured automobile. 
In Thamert v. Continental Casualty Company, 621 
P. 2d 702 (Utah 1980), this Court declined to allow the 
insurance company to set-off from uninsured motorist 
coverage, payments earlier made under a workmen's 
compensation policy. This court again held the Utah 
uninsured motorist law set forth the minimum coverage 
allowed by law. A set-off for other amounts paid would 
reduce the uninsured motorist protection below that level 
mandated by Utah law. 
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 
231 (Utah 1985), the insurance company filed a declaratory 
judgment action. Earlier, Mrs. Call had negligently run 
over her child. The boy sued his mother through the legal 
guardian. Farmers Insurance, the Call carrier, was request-
ed to defend the suit and pay out any damages sustained 
pursuant to the auto policy. Farmers Insurance argued that 
a policy exclusion excused them from filling their 
contractual duties. The exclusion exempted coverage to an 
insured for liability to a household member. 
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This court held the exclusion was without a 
rational basis. The Court found the exclusion contravened 
the Utah statute by providing less coverage than required by 
Utah law. This Court held the exclusion violated public 
policy and void at least up to the minimum coverage required 
by Utah law. 
As in Call, the subject exclusion is without 
rational basis. As discussed below, uninsured motorist 
coverage is not risk related. Coverage is founded on the 
insured person. It does not matter if the injury occurs 
when the insured is on foot, bicycle, skateboard or motorcy-
cle. The exclusion is not a realistic method of calculating 
premiums. It is therefore a source of windfall profit to 
the carrier when rightful claims go unpaid. 
The subject exclusion Violates the minimum 
uninsured motorist coverage required by law. This violation 
is a result of the Bear River conditioning uninsured motor-
ist coverage on the involved insured automobile. 
The Federal District Court for Utah has previously 
ruled on this issue. In Scow v. Farmers Insurance Company, 
Civil No. C80-0121, unpublished (1980), the Court reviewed 
the Utah uninsured statute and case law on the topic. The 
Court held the subject exclusion violated public policy and 
upheld coverage. A copy of the Order is attached hereto. 
(See Exhibit 4.) 
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B. The Fact That Wright Was Driving His Uninsured 
Motorcycle at the Time of the Crash Does Not Justify 
the Exclusionary Clause. 
Bear River's argument in favor of the exclusionary 
clause is based in asserted fairness to the insurance 
carrier. That is, the insured did not pay a premium for the 
motorcycle. Therefore, the insured should not be entitled 
to uninsured motorist coverage while on the motorcycle. 
Other state courts have coined this the "business interest" 
argument. 
The Court in Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La. 
Ct. App. 1972) , reviewed this argument carefully. The court 
found this actuarial computation argument did not apply to 
uninsured motorist coverage. Premiums are charged at a flat 
rate. That is, no difference exists in premiums costs for 
the insured's age, sex or numbers under the policy. 
Uninsured motorist differs greatly from liability 
insurance in this regard. Liability premiums vary widely 
depending on these "risk" factors. 
The Elledge court held the flat rate factor was 
strong evidence that uninsured motorist coverage was 
intended to protect insureds at all times. It found 
insurance carriers cannot: 
create irrational and illusory 
business interests and interpose them as 
a bar to the comprehensive coverage 
required by our statute. 
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The majority of courts th$t have listened to the 
business interest argument have rejected it. See Jacobson 
v. Implement Dealers Ins., 640 P. 2d 908 (Mont.. 1982); 
Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.App. 1972); State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971); 
Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Auto I^ is. Co., 221 N.W.2d 151 
(Minn. 197 4) ; and Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 
697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985). 
C. The Vast Majority of State Courts Which Have Reviewed 
the Exclusionary Clause Have Struck It Down as 
Violative of Public Policy. 
A host of courts have now examined this issue. 
Those courts striking down the exclusion include: Calvert 
v. Farmers Insurance Company, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985) (See 
Exhibit 5) ; Jacobson v. Implement Dealers Mutual Insurance 
Co., 640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982) (See Exhibit 6); State Farm 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reaves, 292 So.2d 95 (Ala. 
1974); Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 252 
So.2d 229 (Fla. 1971); Bass v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co. 196 S.E.2d 485, (Ga. 1973), modified, 201 S.E.2d 
444; Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
(1972), 8 111.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284 (111. 1972); State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 295 N.E.2d 626 
(Ind. App. 1973); Cannon v. American ;Underwriters Inc., 275 
N.E.2d 567 (Ind. App. 1971); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 
912 (La. App. 1972); Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co., 221 N.W.2d 151 (Minn 1974); State Farm Mutual 
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Autombile Ins. Co, v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 
(Nev. 1971); Bell v. State Farm Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co, , 157 
207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974). 
Also, see 1984 Arizona State Law Journal 814-884, 
Fall 1984. 
The court's thinking in Jacobson v. Implement 
Dealers Mutual Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 908 (Mont. 1982), is 
illustrative of those cases. There, the court provided two 
bases for rejecting the exclusion. " . . . (1) the 
exclusionary clause is ineffective because it reduces the 
scope of coverage required by the statutory mandate; . . ." 
and "(2) . . . the policy behind the statute is to protect 
the policyholders from uninsured motorists in all 
instances." at pp.910-911 
POINT II 
THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE DOES NOT INCLUDE 
MOTORCYCLES WITHIN ITS TERMS AND COVERAGE 
EXISTS UNDER THE FACTS 
A copy of the subject policy is attached to the 
brief. (See Exhibit 3.) 
Part IV of the policy describes the uninsured 
coverage. The definition section describes the meaning of 
"insured automobile" as: 
(a) an automobile described in the 
policy for which a specific premium 
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charge indicates that coverage is 
afforded. [Emphasis added^] 
The term "motorcycle" is not found within the 
definitions. If the intent was to exclude all owned motor 
vehicles (not just automobiles) the definition would be more 
inclusive. 
The larger definition section within the liability 
portion of the policy also leaves out the term motorcycle. 
Instead, it too, uses the very limiting term of automobile 
instead of motor vehicle. 
The definition section is used to describe what 
vehicles are covered as well as what vehicles are not. It 
appears the policy was designed to cover automobiles only. 
However, the exclusion only covers automobiles as well. The 
exclusion should not be expanded to include motorcycles. 
The intent of the policy authpris was to exclude 
"automobiles" only. 
This argument is augmented by the fact that the 
"no-fault" portion of the policy specifically excludes 
motorcycles from its coverage. The subject exclusionary 
clause should not be judicially enlarged to exempt 
motorcycles. If the intent was to bar owned motorcycles 
from uninsured motorist protection, the term "automobile" 
should not have been used. 
The policy language clearly calls for uninsured 
motorist coverage under the facts. Even if the policy is 
13 
held to be ambiguous, this court has construed such 
questions in favor of coverage. American Casualty Company 
of Redding Penn. v. Eagle Star Insurance Co., 568 P.2d 731 
(Utah 1977). 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THE EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE IS STRUCK 
DOWN, 
MADE 
, A SET 
UNDER 
'-OFF 
THE 
CANNNOT 
NO-FAULT 
BE TAKEN 
PORTION 
FOR 
OF 
BENEFITS 
THE POLICY 
Bear River has claimed a right to set-off from 
uninsured motorist coverage made pursuant to the Utah 
"no-fault" laws. 
This court has previously ruled on this subject. 
In Thamert v. Continental Casualty Co., 621 P.2d 702 (Utah 
1980), this Court held workmen's compensation benefits could 
not be deducted from uninsured motorist coverage. The court 
found such a deduction would result in uninsured motorist 
coverage in an amount less than the statutory minimum. 
The same result would occur by deducting no-fault 
benefits from uninsured motorist coverage. 
The uninsured motorist statute is silent on the 
right of a carrier to set-off benefits. This court in 
Thamert, Supra, found the lack of a set-off provision in 
state law prevented such deduction. The court found the 
Utah statute set out the minimum benefits which could be 
sold. 
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Utah is not alone in its position. Many states 
have not allowed set-off from statutory uninsured motorist 
benefits. See Bachus v. Farmers Ifts. Group Exchange, 475 
P.2d 264 (Ariz. 1972); Shearer v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co,, 
371 N.E.2d 210 (Ohio, 1978); Dhane v1 Trinity Universal Ins. 
Co. , 497 S.W.2d 323 (Tx. 1973); and, Tullev v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 345 F.Supp. 11^3 (D.C., W.Va. 1972). 
CONCLUSION 
The exclusionary clause teduces the automobile 
insurance coverage below the minimum set by Utah statute. 
The exclusionary clause is Without rational basis. 
The uninsured motorist premium paid by Utah residents is 
paid at a flat rate. The coverage is not realistically risk 
related. The exclusionary clause by silencing lawful claims 
results in the carrier keeping the proceeds it should have 
paid out. 
The attempted set-off for the no-fault benefits 
previously paid would result in benefits being reduced below 
statutory minimums. Utah law does not allow for such a 
reduction. Prior case law should be followed by disallowing 
such set-offs. 
DATED this J?0 day of /flat/ . 1987. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Wrigiit > 
By: \i' ' - 'VW 
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Exhibit a. 
41-12-21 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(b) If any insurance carrier not authorized tb transact business in this 
state, which has qualified to furnish proof of financial responsibility, 
defaults in any said undertakings or agreements, the commission shall not 
thereafter accept as proof any certificate of s^id carrier whether there-
tofore filed or thereafter tendered as proof, so lbng as such default contin-
ues. 
History: L 1951, ch. 71, § 20; C. 1943, 
Supp., 57-13-60. 
41-12-21. Motor vehicle liability policy — Definition — Provisions 
— Coverage, (a) A "motor vehicle liability policy" as said term is used 
in this act shall mean an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insur-
ance, certified as provided in section 41-12-19 orj section 41-12-20 as proof 
of financial responsibility, and issued, except £s otherwise provided in 
section 41-12-20, by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact busi-
ness in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as 
insured. 
(b) Such owner's policy of liability insurance: 
(1) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference 
all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; 
and I 
(2) shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as 
insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor Vehicles with the express 
or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liabil-
ity imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States 
of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of inter-
est and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, in the amount speci-
fied in section 41-12-1 (k) of this act 
(c) Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person 
named as insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him 
by law for damages arising out of the use by h|m of any motor vehicle 
not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and subject to the 
same limits of liability as are set forth above with respect to an owner's 
policy of liability insurance. 
(d) Such motor vehicle liability policy shall state the name and address 
of the named insured, the coverage afforded by the policy, the premium 
charged therefor, the policy period and the limits of liability, and shall 
contain an agreement or be endorsed that insurance is provided thereunder 
in accordance with the coverage defined in this act as respects bodily injury 
and death or property damage, or both, and is subject to all the provisions 
of this act. 
(e) Such motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability 
under any workmen's compensation law as provide^ in Title 35, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended, nor any liability on Recount of bodily injury 
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to or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in the employ-
ment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the opera-
tion, maintenance or repair of any such motor vehicle nor any liability for 
damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by 
the insured. 
(f) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following 
provisions which need not be contained therein: 
(1) the liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance 
required by this act shall become absolute whenever injury or damage cov-
ered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be 
canceled or annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the 
insurance carrier and insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; 
no statement made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said 
policy shall defeat or void said policy; 
(2) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for such injury or 
damage shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insur-
ance carrier to make payment on account of such injury or damages; 
(3) the insurance carrier shall have the right to settle any claim cov-
ered by the policy, and if such settlement is made in good faith, the amount 
thereof shall be deductible from the limits of liability specified in subdivi-
sion (2) of subsection (b) of this section; 
(4) the policy, the written application therefor, if any, and any rider 
or endorsement which does not conflict with the provisions of the act shall 
constitute the entire contract between the parties. 
(g) Any policy which grants the coverage required for a motor vehicle 
liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in addi-
tion to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such 
excess or additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this 
act. With respect to a policy which grants such excess or additional cover-
age the term "motor vehicle liability policy" shall apply only to that part 
of the coverage which is required by this section, 
(h) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide that the insured 
shall reimburse the insurance carrier for any payment the insurance car-
rier would not have been obligated to make under the terms of the policy 
except for the provisions of this act 
(i) Any motor vehicle liability policy may provide for the prorating of 
the insurance thereunder with other valid and collectible insurance. 
(j) The requirements of a motor vehicle liability policy may be fulfilled 
by the policies of one or more insurance carriers which policies together 
meet such requirements. 
(k) Any binder issued pending the issuance of a motor vehicle liability 
policy shall be deemed to fulfill the requirements for such a policy. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 71f §21; C. 1943, Application. 
Supp., 57-13-61. This section applies only to policies 
required as proof of financial responsibility 
after the owner or operator has been in an 
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accident or has violated the motor vehicle 
laws. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg 
(1957) 6 U 2d 399, 315 P 2d 277. 
Unless the insured was within the purview 
of this act when a particular policy was 
issued, its provisions, unless illegal, are sub-
ject to the same construction as any other 
contract. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. 
Chugg (1957) 6 U 2d 399, 315 P 2d 277. 
This section applies only to cases where 
one is compelled to secure a policy after an 
accident in order to be able to continue to 
drive; it pertains to policies obtained under 
the Safety Responsibility Act and has no 
application to policies written before any 
accident occurs. Western Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1971) 26 U 2d 
50, 484 P 2d 1180. 
Policies presented as security under 
No-Fault Act. 
Insurance policies used as security under 
31-41-5 of the No-Fault Insurance Act must 
include minimum omnibus coverage includ-
ing persons operating the vehicle with the 
express or implied permission of the owner-
insurer as provided in this section. Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
(1980) 619 P 2d 329. 
Reasonable investigation. 
Insurer lo^t right to rescind policy by fail-
ure to make reasonable investigation of 
insurability (without regard to provisions of 
subd. (f)(1). IState Farm Mutual Automobile 
Ins. Co. v. ^ood (1971) 25 U 2d 427, 483 P 2d 
892. 
Collateral References. 
Automobil^ liability insurance: permission 
or consent tip employee's use of car within 
meaning of Omnibus coverage clause, 5 ALR 
2d 600. 
Cancellation of compulsory automobile 
insurance, 17[l ALR 550, 34 ALR 2d 1297. 
Construction and application of automatic 
insurance cliuse or substitution provision on 
automobile liability or indemnity policy, 34 
ALR 2d 936. 
Recovery Under automobile property dam-
age policy expressly including or excluding 
collision damage, where vehicle strikes 
embankment^ abutment, roadbed, or other 
part of highway, 23 ALR 2d 389. 
Scope of clause of insurance policy cover-
ing injuries sustained while alighting from 
or entering ajitomobile, 19 ALR 2d 513. 
Validity t>f Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Act, 35 ALR 2d 1011. 
41-12-21.1. Motor vehicle liability policy — Uninsured motorist 
coverage required. Commencing oh July 1, 196[7, no automobile liability 
insurance policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by 
law for bodily injury or death or property damage suffered by any person 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or us^ of a motor vehicle, shall 
be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in tjhis state, with respect to 
any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state, unless 
coverage is provided in such policy or a supplement to it, in limits for bod-
ily injury or death set forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions filed with 
and approved by the state insurance commission jfor IM protection of per-
sons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from 
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor 
vehicles beeausi^ including death, 
resulting therefrom. The named insured shall ha^e the right to reject such 
coverage, and unless the named insured requests!such coverage in writing, 
such coverage need not be provided in a renewal policy or a supplement 
to it where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with 
a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 59, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act providing that no policy of automo-
bile liability insurance may be issued or 
renewed whi^h does not provide uninsured 
motorist coverage. — Laws 1967, ch. 59. 
Amount of coverage. 
It is the indent of the legislature in adopt-
ing this section that an insured, who avails 
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^ON-ASSESSABLE MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE WSURAiNCE POUCY 
Salt Lake CUy. Utah 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
(A Mutual Insurance Comoany, hereinafter called the company) 
Agrees with the insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof. ;n consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance upon the statement 
declarations and suoiect to at! of the terms of this policy: O A Q T I _ . LIABILITY 
Coverage A—3odiiy Injury Liability-, Coverage &—Property Oamage Liability. To pay on 
benaif or the insured ail sums wmch the insured shall become legally obligated to pay 
as carnages oecause or. 
A. aocuv injury, sicxness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter 
called "ooaiiy injury.' sustained bv any oerson: 
3. injury 'o or sestrucnon of property, including loss or use thereof, hereinafter 
caned '"orooefty damage', 
arising cut of trie ownersnio. maintenance or use of the owned automooiie or anv non-
ownec automooiie. ana the comoany inai) aefena any suit aneging sucn booiiy injury or 
prooerty damage ana seeking aamages wnicn are oayaoie unoer the terms ot this 
poucy. even if any ot ^ allegations at the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent: out 
the comoany may make sucn investigation and settlement ot any claim or suit as it 
deems exoeoient. 
Definitions. Linger Part I: 
"named insured" means the individual named in Item I of the declarations 
includes his spouse, it a resioent of the same nousenoid: 
"insured" me^ns a person or organization oescnoeo unoer "Persons insurei 
"relative" means a relative ot the named insured wno is a resident ot the same nc 
Suopiementary Payments. To oay, in addition to the aoolicaole limits of liability: 
ia) ail exoenses incurred by the comoany. ail costs taxed against the insured in any 
sucn suit and ail interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein wmch 
accrues after entry of the judgment and before the comoany has paid or tendered 
or deoositea m court that oart of the judgment wmch does not exceed the limit of 
the comoany s liaoility thereon: 
(b) oremiums on aooeal bonds required »n any such suit, premiums on bonds to release 
attacnmems for an amount not in excess ot the aoplicaole limit of liaoility of this 
poucy. and the cost ot bail bonds required of the insured because of accident or 
trartic law violation arising out of the use of an automooiie insured hereunder, not 
to exceed SlOQ per bail bond, but without any obligation to appty for or furmsn 
an\ such bonds: 
(c) etsenses incurred by the insured tor such immediate medical and surgical reliei to 
otner< as snail ae imoerative at the time of an accident involving an automooiie 
insured hereunaer and not due to war: 
all reasonaoie exoenses. other than loss of earnings, incurred by the insured at 
tne comoany s reouest. 
Persons insured. The following are insured under Part I: 
UJ *'<n resoect to the owned automooiie. 
{{) the named insured and any resident of the same household. 
(2) 3ny other oerson using sucn automooiie with the oermission of the named in-
sured orovioed his actual ooeration or (if he is not coeratmgj his other actual 
use therect is *nnin the scooe ot sucn permission. 3nd 
(3) any otner person or organization but only with resoect to his or its liaOility 
because of acts or omissions ot an insured under (a) (I) or (2) aoove: 
(b) witn resoect to a non«owned automooiie. 
M) the named insured. 
l2) any relative but oniv with resoect to a ornate passenger automobile or trailer 
provided his actual ooeration or (if he »s not ooeratmg) the other actual use 
thereof is with the oermission. or reasonaoly believed to be with the permis 
sion. of trie owner and is within the scooe ot sucn permission, and 
(3) any otner oerson or organization not owning or hiring tne automobile, but 
only witn resoect to his or us liaoility because of acts or omissions of an 
insured under (b) ( l ) or (2) aoove. 
n»« insurance arforoed under Part I aooiies separately to each insured against whom 
cairn is made or suit is brought, but the inclusion herein of more than one insured 
snail not operate to increase the limits ot the company s UaPility 
(2) the corhoany insured ail private passenger, farm and utility automooi 
ed by the named insured on the date or sucn acquisition ana tne n< 
sured hotifies the comoany within 30 days and during the :OIICY o 
sucn acquisition of his election to mane this and no other policy issue 
comoany aooiicable to such automooiie. or 
(d) a temoorary suostitute automooiie: 
"temporary suostitute automooiie" means any automobile or trailer, not ov 
the named insured, while temoorartty used with the oermission of the owner as 
stitute for the qwned automobile or trailer wnenwithdrawn from normal use ! 
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction: 
"non-owned automooiie" means an automooiie or trailer not owned by or fu 
for the regular use of either the named insured or any relative, other than a ter 
suostitute automooiie. 
"private passenger automobile" means a four wneel private passenger, station 
or seep type automooiie: 
"farm automooiie" means an automobile of the truck tyoe with a load cao 
fif\een nundred pounds or less not used for business or commercial puroose 
than farming; 
"utility automooiie" means an automobile, ather than a farm automooiie. wttf 
capacity of fifteen hundred pounds or less ot the oicx-up body, sedan delivery c 
true* type not ysed for Business or commercial ourooses; 
'Trailer* means a trailer designed for use with a private oassenger automooii< 
being used for business or commercial ourooses *un other than a onvate oas 
farm or utility automooiie. or a farm wagon or farm implement wmie used witn 
automooiie: 
"automooiie business" means the business or occupation of selling, repairing, 
mg. storing or parking automooiies: 
"use" of an automooiie includes the loading and unloading thereof. 
-war" means war. wrtether or not declared, avii war. insurrection, reoeihon c 
tution. or any ait or condition modem to any of the foregoing. 
Exclusions. This ooiicy does not apply under Pan I: 
(a) to any automooiie while used as a ouonc or iivery conveyance, but this r. 
does not apply to tr^ named insured with resoect to ooptiy injury or : 
damage wmcn results from the named insured's occupancy of a noo-owni 
mooue otheif than as the operator thereof: 
(b) to oodiiy injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the dire 
the insured: 
I to bodily injury or prooerty damage with resoect to which an insured under this 
policy is also sn insured under a nuclear energy liability policy issued by 
Nuciear Energy Liability Insurance Association. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability 
Underwriters or Nuciear Insurance Association of Canada, or would be an insured 
under any such policy but for its termination upon exhaustion of its limit of 
Iiaoility; 
) to oooiiy injury or prooerty damage arising out of the operation of farm machinery: 
I to bodily injury to any emoioyee of the insured 3nsing out of 3nd in the course of 
(I) domestic emoiovment oy the insured, if benefits therefor are m wnole or in 
parr either payaole or recuired to be provided under 3ny worxmen s condensation 
law. or :2) other emoiovment by the insured: 
to bodily injury to 3nv fellow emoioyee of the insured injured in the course of His 
emoiovment if such injury arises out of the use of an automooile in the ousmess 
of his emoioyer. Out this exclusion does not aooly to the named insured wttn 
resoect to injury sustained by any sucn fellow emoioyee: 
to 3n owned automooile wmie used by any person wmie such person is emoioyed 
or otherwise engaged m the automobile business. Out this exclusion does not aooly 
to the named insured, a resident ot the same housenold as the named insured, a 
partnership in wnich the named insured or sucn resident is a partner, or any 
partner, agent or emoiovee of the nameo insured, sucn resident or oartnershio; 
to a non-owned automooile *nne maintained or used by any person wmie sucn 
person ,s emoiovea or otherwise engaged in (I) the automooile business of the 
.nsurec or :f anv otner person or organization. (2) any other ousir>ess or occuoanofi 
of the insured, but this exclusion (hi (2) i ces not oooiy to a orr/ate oassenger auto-
mooile :oerateo or occupied by the named insured or oy ms ortvate cnaurfeur or 
domestic servant or a trailer used therewith or with an owneo auromoone: 
to imury to or cestrucnon of (1) orooerty owned or transoorred by the insured or 
;2) orooerty rented to or in cnarge or the insured otner than a residence or 
private parage: 
to the ownersmp. natntenance. operation, use. loading or unloading of sn automo-
biie ownersmo of wmcn «s acauired Oy the named insured during the ooncy period 
ar 3ny temporary suosntute automooiie therefor, if the named insured has pur-
chased other automooile Iiaoility insurance aobticaole to sucn automoo 
which a soecfic premium charge has h^trr made. 
Financial Responsibility Laws. When this policy is certified as oroof of financial r 
sioiiity for The future under the provisions of any motor vehicfe financial resoon 
law. sucn insurance as is afforded by this policy for oodily injury iiaoility or fa; 
erty damage itaOiiity shall comoly with the provisions of-sucn law to the extent 
coverage ana limits of Iiaoility reouired by sucn law. but in no event in excess 
limits ot Iiaoility stated in this policy. The insured 3grees to reimourse the co 
for any payments made by the comoany which it would not have been ooii^a 
make under the terms of this policy exceot the agreement contained .< 
parasraon. 
Limits of Liability. The limit of bodily injury liability stated m the dectaratic 
appncaoie to 'eacn oerson ' is the limit of the comoany s uaoiiity for ail can 
including damages for care and loss of services, arising out ot oodily injury sus 
by one oerson as the result or 3ny one occurrence: the limit ot sucn naoiiitv 
m the declarations as aooticaole to 'eacn occurrence" is. suoject to the aoove 
sion resoecting each person, the total limit ot the comoanv s iiaoiiity for ait sucn 
ages arising out ot bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the re« 
any one occurrence. 
The limit of prooerty damage liability stated m \r\t declarations as aoclica 
"eacn occurrence' is the total limit of 'he comoanv s iiaoiiitv Jar ail ^amazes < 
out of or miury to or destruction of all orooerry at :ne or more persons :r or? 
•ions, including the >oss of use thereof, as the result ot anv one occurrence. 
Other Insurance. If the insured has other insurance against a ;oss covered bv 
ot this ooiicy the comoany snail not be ttaaie uncer mis soiicy for a greater orcc 
of sucn loss than the aooltcaole umit of Iiaoility stated m the declarations :e 
the total aooltcaole limit or iiaoility of ail vand ana coilecticie insurance a^ams: 
loss, provided, however, the T.surance *»th resoect to a temoorarv suostitute 
mooiie or non-owned aut»mcoile snail be excess insurance over any otner van 
collectible insurance. 
PART II - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
SECTION I 
Comoanv agrees with the named insured, subject to ail of the provisions in this 
orsement and to all of the provisions of iht policy except as modified herein, as 
3ws: 
CTION I 
.SONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
Comoanv will oav personal injury protection benefits to or on benaif of eacn eligtbie 
red oerson ror: 
a) medical expenses. 
b) work loss. 
O funeral expenses, and 
0) survivor loss 
i resoect to ooaily injury sustained bv an eligible mjureo person caused by an 
dent involving the use or a motor venicle as a motor venicie. 
usions 
i coverage does not aopiy: 
to ooailv injury sustained by any person while occuoymg a motor vehicle which 
is owned by the named insured and wmcn is not an insured motor venicie: 
to ooaily injur/ sustained oy the named insured or 3ny relative wmie occuoymg 
a motor venicie wmcn is owned bv a relative ana for wmcn the security required 
by the Ut3n Automooile No-fauit Insurance Ac: ;s not in effect: 
to ooailv imurv sustained bv 3nv oerson wmie ooeratmg the insured motor venicie 
without the exoress or imoiiea consent ot the insured or wmie not m tawiul posses-
sion or the msurea motor venicie: 
o badilv injury sustained bv 3ny person injured wnile occuoymg or. while a pedes-
nan tnrougn the use ot any motor venicie. otner than the insured motor venicie. 
or wmcn tne security required under the Utan Automooiie No-fauit Insurance Act 
s in erfect: 
o bodily injury sustained by anv person, if such persons conduct contributed to 
us injury unoer either of the following circumstances: 
1) causing mjurv to himself intentionally, or 
2) wmie committing a felony: 
o bodily mjurv sustained by anv person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle 
'niie located for use as a residence or oremises: 
o-ooaily injury due to war. wnether ar not deer"***4, civil war. insurrectidn, rebellion 
r revolution, or to any act or condition mctaer ny of the foregoing; 
o bodily injury resulting from the radioactive^«iic exoiosive or other hazardous 
irooemes of nuci»2r mar^nai 
Policy Period: Territory 
This coverage aopiies only to accidents which occur during the poiicy period and v 
the Umtea States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canaaa. 
Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds aoolicacle. claims r 
or insured motor vehicles to wmcn this coverage aoones. the Comoanv's liaotul 
personal injury protection benefits witn resoect to boaiiy injury sustained by an> 
eiigioie injured oerson in any one motor venicie accident, is limited as follows:' 
i. the maximum amount oayaoie for medical exoenses snail not exceed 32.300: 
2. the maximum amount pavaoie forworn loss is 
(a) eignty five percent of any loss of gross income and earning caoacity, n 
exceed the total of 5150 per week: 
(b) Not exceeding $12.00 per dav for services actually rendered or exoenses rea 
aolv incurred for ser/ices that, but for the injury the injured person would 
performed for his housenold. 
3. the maximum amountpayaole for funeral exoenses shail not exceed $1,000: 
4. the amount pavaoie for survivor loss is S2.QGQ and is payaole only to na 
persons wno are the eligible-injured oerson s neirs: 
5. anv amount payable by the Comoanv under the terms of this coverage sha 
reduced by the amount paid, payaole. or reouired to oe provided on accoui 
sucn boaiiy injury 
(a) unoer any workmen's condensation plan or anv similar statutory plan, : 
than Utan's Wornmen's Condensation Plan 
(b) by the United States or any of its agencies because of his or ner bein 
active duty in the military services. 
(c) unaer any aopiicaole deductible set forth m this endorsement or m the p 
to wmcn it is attached. 
Conditions 
A. Action A$3inst Comoany. Mo action snail lie against the Comoanv unless as a com 
precedent thereto, there snail have oeen fun comonance with ail the terms o 
coverage. 
8. Notice. In the event of an accident, written notice containing particulars surfi 
to identify the eiigioie injured oerson. and also reasonaoly ootainaole inform 
resoecting the time, place and circumstances of the accident snail be given 
on oenait ot eacn eiigioie injured person to the Comoanv or any of its authc 
agents as soon as oracticaole. If any eiigioie tmured oerson. his legal reoresent 
or nis survivors shall institute legal action to recover damages for boaiiy injury ag 
a oerson or organization wno is or may be liaoie in tort theretor. a'cony o 
summons and complaint or other process served m connection with such legal a 
shall be forwarded as soon as practicaole to the Comoany oy sucn eligible m 
person, his legal reoresentative. or his survivors. 
C. Meoical Reports: Proof of Claim. As soon as oracticaole the eligible injured pi 
or someone on his behalf snail give to the Company written proof of claim, i 
oath if required, inc l ines full particulars of the nature and extent of the »nj 
and treatment receiv d contemoiated. and sucn other jinformation as mav < 
the Comoanv In defsi ^ ??»* zmmiat .•*•.!* -»*** «-...*»..-. n.- >-
 t 
ti* bodily injury caused by an •t?nts. Sucn oerson s j J L E. Reimbursement and 1WR 
under ttiis coverage: 
I. the Comoany 
of any settlement or judgment that may result from rr:e exercise or any 
of recovery ot| 
(or tne aodily[ 
shall have a 
to the personl 
3. 
(3) the named insured or any relative who 
' accident involving the use of any motor vernc 
(b) any other oerson wno sustains boaily injury caused by an accident while 
(1) occupying t^t insured motor vemcie with the consent or the insured or 
(2) occuoymg any other motor vemcie, other than a puoiic or livery conveyance, 
ooerated by tne named insured or a relative, or 
(3) a oeoestnan 1/ the accident involves iht use or the insured motor vehicle. 
"funeral exoenses" means funeral, burial or cremation exoenses incurred: 
"insured' means the named insured, the soouse or other relative or the named insured 
*no resides m rhe same nousenoid as the named insured, including those wno usually 
mane their nome n me same nousenoid out temooraniv live eisewnere. or anv parson 
using tne :escnoed motor vemcie wun tne permission, either exoresseo or :monea. 
of the owner 
"msureo motor vemcie' means a motor vemcie with resoect to which 
(a) the iodslv miurv itaoiutv insurance ot tne poncy aopues and for which a soecific 
premium is charged, and 
(b) the named msureo is required to maintain security under the provisions of the 
Utan Automooile No-Fauit Insurance Act: 
"medical exoenses means tne reasonaoie exoenses incurred for necessarv medical. 
surgical, x-ray. dental and renaoilitation services, including prosthetic devices, necessarv 
amcuiance noscitai, ind nursing services, and anv nonmedical 'emeaiai cm ano 
treatment '?nc»r?o m accorcance wun a recognizee metnod 01 healing; t :oes not 
'nciuce **censes >n excess at those ;ar 3 semi-anvate room, uniess more intensive 
:2re s meciciiif 'eouired. 
mc::r .en-cie means 3nv vemcie or a Hind reouireo to oe registered wun tne Division 
or Mo::' vehicles or tns Jtan State "ax Commission unoer litte - I 119. Utan Ccae 
Annotated .'ill :u: excluding motorcycles: 
'"nameo .nsureo means :ne oerson or organization named in the declarations: 
"occuoving* means :emg in or uoon a motor teniae as a passenger or ooerator or 
engaged n -ne 'mmeciate acts or entering, soaramg or angnting from a motor vemcie-
"pedestrian means anv person not occuoymg or riding uoon a motor vemcie. otner 
tnan anv oerson occusving or namg uoon a motorcvcie. 
relative means a soouse or any other oerson related to the named insured bv oiooo. 
marriage or aoootion (including a -vara or roster cmid) wno is 3 resident or the same 
nousenoio as tne named insured, or wno usually makes ms home in the same nousenoid 
but temooraruy lives eisewnere. 
"survivor ;oss means comoensation on account of the death of :he eligible injured 
person-
'worn IOSS" means rai !oss of income 3nd loss of earning cooacitv ov the eli^iole »niured 
person curing "is lifetime *rom maoiiirv to worn aunng 3 oerioa commencing tnree aavs 
arter the :ste of tne ooci>v miurv ano continuing *or 3 maximum oi 52 consecutive 
«eens trere2**er orovicec tr.at if sucn eiigioie injured oerson s .naonitv to wor* snail 
sc ::nt:r.ue ':r n ^xces: ar a total or two consecutive *ee*s after tne aate or tne ocotlv 
murv :rtts tnree aay elimination penoa snail not oe aooiicaoie: ano (b) a soeciai dam-
ages allowance 'or services actually renaered or exoenses reasonaoiv incurred for ser-
vices that, out ror tne injury, the injured oerson would nave oerTormea for ms nousenoid 
commencing not iater than tnree aavs after the date of the miury and continuing for a 
maximum or 355 days thereafter, but if the oerson s inability to perrorm these services 
snaii so continue for m excess of a total of fourteen days arter the date or injury, this 
tnree-cay „m ,na t ,on p m 0 snail not be aoccaoU. p A R T n | _ p H Y S I C A L DAMAGE 
» auvi aa wnatever else is necessary to secure 
hing after loss to oretudice sucn ngnts. 
**reement. In the event of any payment to any a 
snail be entitled to the extent of such oayment to the pro 
such person against any person or organization legally resooi 
injury because ot wmcn sucn payment ,s made: 3nd the Con 
len to the extent or sucn payment, notice or wmcn mav be 
or organization causing sucn oocily injury, his agent, his \t\ 
or a court having jurisdiction m the matter: 
2. sucn person snail hold in trust tor the oenefit or the Comoanv ail rignts or rec 
wmcn ne snail have against sucn otner person or organization :ecause :r 
300ilv miurv: | 
sucn oerson pall do wnatever is prooer to secure ano snail :o notnmg 
loss to oreiuaice sucn ngnts: 
4. sucn oerson inail execute and deliver to the Comoany -nstruments 3no : 
as may ce ao|oroonate to secure me ngnts ano sensations 01 sucn oersor 
the Comoanv ^staoiishec bv this provision 
F Non-Ouciication jjf Benefits: Other insurance. No eiigioie miured oerscn snail re 
duoiicare oenenrjs tor the same elements of loss unoer this or *nv simnar msur 
In the event th?t an eiigioie .mured oerson *no is a named nsureo. a r«i 
or *no ,s .niurei m an accicenr .nvoivmg the use of an nsurec -ncrcr venic: 
otner iimuar n|surance avaiiacie ino aooncaoie 'a 'ne accident :ne ^ax 
recover/ uncer jii -ucn insurance sr.aii not exceed n? amount *nicn *ou:d 
:een covaoie unoer 'ne provisions at 'ne insurance ::r;:-3ing tne ^'«n»s: cc.ar 
anG tne Comoan|y snail not :e laoie 'or 1 ;re2*er :rcoort:on or an-.- oss :: 
this coverage aojones than tne t:mit or !;aou:tv -ereuncer rears t: tne cum : 
aociicaate :imits|or iiaoinry or :ms coverage anc sucn ::ner nsurance. in -ne 
tnat an eiigioie injures person, otner ?nan 3 named msureo. relative, or a : 
.vno is niured 1(1 an accident nvoivmg *ne jse :r in insured motor vemcie 
otner similar nsujrance avauaoie ano aooncaoie to tne accident, tne coverage :ro 
unoer this endorsement snail oe excess over sucn otner insurance, 
SECTION I! 
In consideration of }he coverage arforaed unaer Section l and the adjustment or aoi 
ble rates: | 
(a) anv amount payable unoer the Uninsured Motorists Coverage snail be rec 
ov tne amoynt of any personal injury protection oenents paid or oavaole • 
this or inv rather automooiie insurance poncy because nf oooily injury oust 
by an engiblte injured person 
SECTIJON !(! 
The oremium :or :h;e policy is oased on rates wmcn nave oeen estaoissnec n -ei 
uoon tne imitattorts on trie ngnt to recover ror oamages imocseo :v tne orovi 
of the 'Jtan Automooiie No-fauit insurance Act. !n the event a court or ccmo 
lunsaiction declares, or enters a judgment tne ertec: of wmcn is to render, tne orovi 
of sucn act invalid or unenrorceaole m wnoie or m part, the Company snail havi 
right to recompute the premium payaole for the poiicv ana the orovisions or 
endorsement snail be voidable or sudiect to amenament at the option of the Comoa 
Coverage 0 (1) Comprehensive (excluding Collision); (2) Personal Effects. 
(1) To pay for loss caused other than by collision to [tit owned automooiie or to a 
non-ownea automooile. For the puroose of this coverage. dreaKage of glass and 
loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or larceny, explosion, earth-
quake, rftndstorm. nail, water. Mood, malicious mischief or vandalism, not or civil 
commotion or colliding with a bird or animal, shall not be deemed to be loss 
caused by collision. 
(2) To pav for toss caused by fire or lightning to robes, #eanng aoparei and other 
personal effects wmeft are the prooerry of the named insured or a relative, wniie 
sucn effects are m or uoon the owned automooiie. 
Coverage £—Collision. To oay for loss caused by collision to the owned automooile 
or to a non-owned automooile but only for the amount of each such loss m excess 
of the aeouctioie amount stated in the declarations as aooncaoie hereto. The 
deductible amount snait not aooiy to loss caused by a collision with another auto-
mooiie msureo by the comoany. 
Coverage F—fire. Lightning and Transoortation. To oay for loss to the owned auto-
mooiie or a non-owned automooiie, caused (ai by fire or lightning, (b) by smoKe or 
smudge due to a sudden, unusual and faulty ooeration of any fixed neating eouioment 
serving tne oremises m wmcn the automooiie is located, or (c; by the stranding, 
sinking, burning, collision or derailment ot any conveyance in or uoon wmcn the 
automooile is oetng transoorted. 
Coverage S—Theft. To oay for loss to the owned automobile or to a non-owned auto-
mooile causeo by theft or larceny. 
Coverage H—Combined Additional Coverage. To pay for loss to the owned automobile 
or a non-ownea automooile caused by wmastorm. hail, earthquake, explosion not or 
civil commotion, or tne forced landing or tailing of any aircraft or its oarts or eouio-
ment. flood or rising waters, malicious miscmet or vandalism, external discnarge or 
leaxage of water exceot loss resulting from rain, snow or sleet wnether or not wind-
driven: oroviaed. wan resoect to eacn automooiie S25 snail be deducted from eacft 
loss caused by malicious miscnief or vandalism. 
£ T ! ! a t ! ^ r o w , n t a?d U O 0 f C a , t t - To » y <<* « * •«* and labor costs necessitated 
- ^ • . J 3 , s , a o i e m w t °< tne ° * ° * * automooile or of any non-owned automooiie. pro-jided the laoor .* performed at tne oiace of disablement 
Sueptemtntary Payments. In addition to the aooncaoie limit of liability-
£ I ™ ' S t I ! * , n w « for transoortation exoenses incurred during the period 
22?rS!!V* oufS ? i t 8 f a tnt,t C0VCfM bY tm$ oo,,cv ** ** «nt,r« »to-T. lltnZJV" rWOrtWl t0.tflt comoany ana tfte ^ice- " « terminating wnen he automooiie is returned to use or tne comoany gays for the loss; provided 
>AU oer aay or totaling more tftan S3QQ. 
! L « f f , J ! ! ! , r a l 3V€fa?e and ******* « w t « ^ wmch the insured becomes teeaiiy daoie. as to tne automooile oetn* transoorted. oewmes 
2 5 . T!l! ( l e , , f l , , , o w * ""*"«« insured-, relative \ -!efmjort#y substitute 
E X P ^ L - . 9 r w i l t ********* wtomooiie*. -farm automooile' "utuVtv VuVfl-
^ ? « r „ i a y i 0 m ? 0 , 4 t »******'• "**•". » - « « • automooile" in ?£] 2 S 
2J2TiiL I J T r "—* a u l o w o o < * « * **** « ««««tt. «nder Part III. m a t S 5 2 
rTtm Jr % "*****>«**'** o" «»• tllectiwt date of this ooticy and not descrtbed 
serein, or (Z) 3 trailer ownersmo of wmcn is acmi.red dunn* the 00 ,cv " nol 
"insured" means (91 with resoect to an owned automooiie. (1) the named insi 
and (2) any oerson or organization (other than a oerson or organization emoi 
or otherwise engaged in tne automooile business or as a carrier or other 3. 
for hire) maintaining, using or navmg custody ot said automooile with the oermi« 
of the named insured and within the scooe of sucn oermtssion: (b) with resoet 
a non-ownea automobile, the named insured and any relative wmle using sucn 
mobiie. provided his actual ooeration or (if ne is not ooeratmgj the other a< 
use thereof is with the permission, or reasonaoly beiieved to be witn the 
mission, of the owner and is within the scooe of sucn permission-. 
"non-owned automobile" means a private passenger automooile or trailer not o> 
by or furmsned for the regular use of either tne named insured or any reia 
otner than a temodrary substitute automooile, *niie said automooiie or trailer 
the possession or custody or the insured or is oemg ooerated by him-, 
"toss" means direct and accidental loss of or damage to la) the automobile, in 
ing its eduioment. or (bJ other insured prooerty-. 
"collision" means collision of an automobile covered by this policy with an 
£Oiect or witn a vemcie to wmcn it is attacned or oy uoset of sucn automooiii 
"trailer" means a trailer designed for use with a orivate oassenger automooile, i 
being used tor ousiness cr commercial purooses wun otner tnan a orivate passe 
(arm or utility automooiie. and \i not a name, ottice. stare, cusotay or passenger u 
Exclusions. This ocjncy does not aooly unoer Part ill: 
(a) to any automobile wmle used as a puoiic or livery conveyance 
lb) to loss due to war; 
(d to loss to a nqn-owned automobile arising out of its use by the insured 
he is emoioyed or otherwise engaged in tne automooiie ousmess: 
(d) to loss to a ornate oassenger. farm or utility automooiie or trailer owned b 
named insured land not described in this poncy or to anv temoorary suosi 
automobile therefor, if the insured has otner valid ana collectible msui 
against such loss: 
(e) to damage whic|n is due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, mecnamc 
electrical breakdown or failure, unless sucn damage results from a tnert CO' 
by this poncy; \ 
(f) to tires, unless damaged by fire, malicious mischief or vandalism, or stoii 
unless tne loss be coincident witn and from the same cause as other toss co 
by tms ooticy; 
(g) to loss due to radioactive contamination: 
(h) under Coverage E. to breakage of glass if insurance with resoect to sucn bre; 
is otherwise afforded. 
Limit of Liability. The limit of the comoany s liability for loss- shall not v. 
the actual casn value of the prooerry, or if the loss is ot a part tnereo 
actual casn value of sucn part, at time of loss, nor what it would then co 
reoair or reolace the prooerry or sucn part thereof with other of (ike unc 
quality, nor. witn resoect to an owned automooiie described in this policy 
aooncaoie limit of liability stated in the declarations: provided, however, the 
of the comoany's liability (ai for loss to personal effects arising out of any one c 
rence is S1QQ. and (b) tor loss to any trailer not owned by the named insured is 
Other Insurance, it the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by 
HI of this oolicv. !the comoany shall not be iiaOie under this policy tor a* %r 
ss trie company insures ail private passenger, farm anil utility automooiies and 
ers owned by the named insured on me date of sucn acquisition and the 
ed insured notifies the comoany during the policy period or within 20 days 
' the Cate of sucn acouisition of his election to make this and no other policy 
!d by the company aooiicaoie to sucn trailer. 
prooomon of sucn ioss than the aooiicaoie limit cf liaoiiity of :ms policy be 
tne total aooliC30le limit of liaoihty of an vand ana collectible insurance a 
such loss: provided, however, the insurance witn resoect to a temcorary suo 
automooiie or non-owned automooiie snail be excess insurance over anv otnei 
and collectible insurance. 
PART IV-PROTECTION AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
rage J—Uninsured Motorists (Qamages for Sodily Iniury). To pay all sums *mch 
nsured or ms ;egai reoresentative snail be legally entitled to recover as damages 
tne owner or ooerator of ^n uninsured automooiie because cf bodily m;ury. sicx-
or disease. mcuding deatn resulting tnerefrom. Hereinafter called "bodily 
y." sustained ay tne insured, caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
maintenance or use of sucn uninsured automooiie: provided, 'or tne purooses 
us coverage, determination as to wnether the insured or sucn reoresentative is 
ly entitled to recover sucn damages, ana if sa tne amount tnereof. snail be 
» oy agreement between tne insured or sucn reoresentative and the comoany or. 
ey 'an to agree. by arbitration. 
jucgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally resconsiole 
he -ccuv -niury snail ce conclusive, as between me insured and tne ccmoanv. 
e issues of i'aointy cf sucn person or organization cr of tne amount of aam-
;o *mcn tne -.nsurec :s legally entitled unless sucn judgment is entered our-
: *o an action prosecuted oy tne insured witn tne written consent of tne comoany. 
itions. Tne definitions under Part I. exceot tne definition of "insured."' aopty 
irt iV. ana under Part iV-
red" -neans. 
e named .nsured and any relative: 
iy otner oerson wmie occupying an -nsured automooiie: ano 
iv oerson. witn resoect to oamages ne is entitled to recover because of bodily 
to wmen this Port aooues sustained OY an insured under 'ai or to) aoove. 
nsurancc afforded unoer Part IV aooues seoaratelv to eacn insured, but tne 
;ion herein ct Ttore tnan one insured snail net ooerate to increase the limits cf 
r
 s iiaotiity. 
yfe*jt^iiifwRCT&f] 
a private cassanger. fafifi or utility automooiie. ownersnip ot wmch is acouired 
i namec 'nsured aunng the policy period, provided 
reoiaces an insured automooiie as aefined m (a) aoove. or 
e comoany insures under this coverage ail private passenger, farm and utility 
itomooiles owned oy the named insured on the date of sucn acouisition and the 
imed insured notifies the comoany during the policy period or within 30 days 
ter the cate of sucn acquisition or his election to mane the liability and Umn-
red Motorist Coverages unaer this and no other policy issued by the company 
iQiicabie to such automooiie. 
temoorary suostituce automooiie for an insured automooiie as defined m (a) or 
love, and 
(d) a non-owned automobile whiie being ooerated by the named insured: and the 
"insured automooiie" includes a trauer *mle being used witn an automooiie ces< 
in (a), (b). (c) or (d) above, but snail not include-
(1) any automooiie or trailer owned by a resiaent of the same housenoid a 
named insured. 
(2) any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance, or 
(3) any automooiie wftile being used without the permission of the owner, 
"uninsured automobile" includes a trailer of anv type and means: 
(a) an automooiie or trailer with resoect to the ownersmo. maintenance cr «j 
whicn there is. in at least th* amounts specified bv the financial respcnsicii^ 
of the state m wmen the insured automooiie is pnncioailv garaged, to coc:; JJ 
liaoiiity bona Qr insurance policy aooiicaoie at tne lime of :ne acacent *«tn -? 
to any ;erson or organization iegaiiv resoonsioie 'or tne use of sucn automooi 
with resoect to *nicn tt)^r» is a ooaily miurv liaomty bono or insurance POUCY 
caole at the rime of the 3cciaent out the comoany anting tne same semes :ov 
thereunder, or 
(b) a hit-and-run automobile: 
but the term 'uninsured automooiie" snail not include: 
(1) an insured automooiie or an automooiie iurmsned for the regular use o 
named insured or a relative. 
(2) an automooiie or trailer owned or ooerated by a seif-insurer within the meam 
any motor venicie financial resoonsioiiity law. motor carrier law or any simiiai 
(3) an automobile or trailer owned by tt\e United States of America. Canada, a i 
a political suodivision of any sucn government or an agency of any of the 
going. 
(4) a land motor venicie or trailer if ooerated on rails or crawler-treads or 
located for use as a residence or premises and not as a vemcie. or 
(5) a farm type tractor or souioment designed for use principally off public r 
•xceot wnne actually uoon oudlic roacs. 
"hit-and-run automobile" means in automooiie wmch causes bodily injury to a 
sured arising out ot pnysicai contact of sucn automooiie witn the insured or wn 
automooiie wmen the insured is occupying at tne time of tht accident, provide* 
there cannot oe ascertained the identity of either the ooerator or the owner of 
"hit-and-run automobile"; (b) the insured or someone on his benalf snail have re 
ed the accident within 24 hours to a ooiice. peace or judicial officer or to the 
missioner of Motor Vehicles, and snail have filed with the company within 30 
thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal reoresentative r 
cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for carnages against a pc 
or persons wnose identity is unascertainadie. and setting forth the facts in sut 
thereof; and (ci at the comoany's reouest. the insured or his legal represent; 
makes avaiiaoie for inspection the automobile wnich tne insured was occupym 
the time of tne accident 
ryint" means in or uoon or entering into or aiigntmg from, 
i" includes tne District ot Coiumoia. a territory or possession of the United 
and a province of Canada. 
wws. This potter d«*s not awiy unutr Pan IY*. ; _ „ 
bcoiiv injury to an insured wfltfe occuoymg an autcmobtfrf other than an >wred 
omooiie* awmto bvjine named insured-or a reta&vtv or through being ^ i c x 
wen an antomooiietV •>< *«—««* * • - * ***- -*~. 
boo.lv miury to an insure* wjtH r&MSSSitfK.Wk^lmtk his legal reore-
itative or any person entitled to oayment under this coverage snail, without 
tten consent or tht comoany, mane any settlement with any person or organ* 
:ion wno may oe Iegaiiv iiaole therefor: 
is to mure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen s condensation or 
aoiiity oenents earner or any person or organization auaiifymg as a seif-msurer 
ler any worxmen s compensation or disaouuy oenents law or any similar law. 
of Liability. 
i limit of liability for umsured motorists coverage stated m the declarations iz 
ole to *acn person ' is the limit ot the comoany s liaoiiity for ail damages, 
ig damages for care or loss ot services, because ot booiiv injury sustained bv 
rson as tne result ot any one accident and. suoiect to tne aoove provision 
mg eacn person, the limit ot liability stated in the declarations as aooiicaoie 
n accident' is the total limit of the comoany *s liaoiiity for ail damages, mciud-
nages tor care or loss of services, because of bodily injury sustained by two or 
ersons as the result ot any one accident. 
' amount payaoie unoer the terms ot this Part because of bodiiv injury sustained 
iccident by a persdn wno is an insured under this Part snail be reduced by 
sums paid on account ot such bodily injury by or on benalf ot (i) the owneror 
Tatar of the uninsured automobile and (u) any other person or organization 
itty or severally iiaole togetner w»tn sucn owner or operator for sucn bodily 
iry including ail sums paid under Coverage A. and 
amount paid and the present value ot ail amounts payable on account of such 
lily injury under any workmen s compensation law. disaoiiity benefits law or 
similar law. 
payment made under this Part to or for any insured shall be aooiied in reduc-
the amount of damages wmen he may oe entitled to recover from any person 
under Coverage A. 
( comoany snail not be obligated to pay under this coverage that part of the 
a whicn the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner or operator ot 
sured automooiie wmen represents expenses tor medical services paid or pay-
der Part II. 
Other Insurance. Witn resoect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an au 
mooiie not owned by tne named insured, the insurance under Part IV snail aoply o. 
as excess insurance over any other sirmfar insurance avaiiaale* to sucn insured i 
appiicaote to sucn automooiie as primary insurance, and this insurance snail tp 
aoply only in tne amount by wmen tne limit of liaoiiity for this coverage exceeds t 
aooiicaoie limit of liaoiiity of such otner insurance. 
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraon, if the insured has other simi 
insurance available to him and aoolicaple to the 3cciderx. ifi€ damages snail 
deemed not to exceed the nigher of the aooiicaoie limits of liaoiiity of this msu/ar 
and sucn other insurance, and the comoany snail not be liable for a greater proo 
tion ot any loss to wmen this coverage aoplies than tne timit of liaoiiity nereunc 
bears to the sum of the aopweaale Warns ot WaoUity of this insurance ana si 
otner insurance. 
Arbitration. If any perscn malting claim hereunder 3nd the ccmoany do not agree t! 
sucn person is legally entitled to recover carnages from the owner or ooerator of 
uninsured automooiie because of bodily injury to tne insured, or do not agree as 
the amount ot pavment wmen may oe owing unoer this Part. then, uoon writ: 
demand of either, the matter or matters uoon wmen sucn oerson and tne comoanv 
not agree shall be settled by aroitratidn m accordance witn the rules of the Amenc 
Arbitration Association, and judgment uoon tne award rendered by tne arcitratcrs <T 
be entered m any court having jurisdiction thereof. Sucn person and the como« 
eacn agree to consider itself bound and to se bound by any award made by tne ar 
trators pursuant to this Part. 
Trust Agreement. In the* event of payment to any person under this Part: 
(aJ the company snailbe entitled to tne extent of sucn oayment to tne proceeds of j 
settlement or judgment that may result from rne exercise ot any rignts of recovery 
sucn person against any person or organization legally resoonsioie for the boo 
injury Oecause of wftich sucn payment is mace: 
(b) sucn person snail hold in trust for the benefit of the comoany ail ngnts of recovi 
wmen ne snail have against sucn otner person or organization because ot the damas 
wnicn are the suoject of claim made unoer this Part: 
(ci sucn person snail do wnatever is.proper to secure and shall do nothing after tc 
to prejudice sucn ngnts: 
(d) «f reouested in writing by the company, sucft person shall take, through any reo 
sentative designated by the comoany, sucn action as may oe necessary or aooroon; 
to recover sucn payment as damages from sucn other oerson or organization, su 
action to be taken in the name of sucn person: in the event ot a recovery, the comoj 
shall be reimbursed out of sucn recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys' fi 
incurred by it in connection therewith: 
(ei SUCh Oersort snail sseeut* an* rl»<iv.r in **• ,-««.»,-** «...-*» :—* j 
*« MWVCU, uwuuuiuni jyyiy toi an rarts.' 
1 . ?elicy Perirt. Territory. This policy aopltes o. J accidents, occurrences and 
loss during the policy period wmie the automooile ts within the United States or Amer-
ica, its territories or possessions, or Canada, or is bang transported between pons 
thereof. 
2 - Premium. If the named insured disposes of, acquires owtiershia cf. or replace*. 
a private passenger, 'arm or utility automooile or, with resoect to Part III. a trailer, 
any premium adjustment necessary snail be made u of the date of such change 
in accordance with the manuals m use oy the comoany. The named insured shall, 
uoon request, furmsn reasonaole proof of the numoer of sucn aucomooiles or trail-
ers and a aescnotion thereof. 
3 . Notice. In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss, written notice contain-
•ng particulars sufficient to identify tne insured and aiso reasonaoiy ootamaoie infor-
mation witn resoect to tne time, place ana circumstances thereof, and the names ana 
aaaresses of the s.»|ureo and of avaiiaoie witnesses, snail ae given by or for the «n-
surea to the comoanv or my of its authorized agents as soon as oracticaoie. in the 
event or theft the insured snail also oromotty notify the ponce, if claim is made or 
suit is arougnt against the nsured. he snail immediately forward to the comoany every 
demand, notice, summons or otner process received 3y nim or his reoresentative. 
if, before the comoany manes pavment of loss unaer Port IV. tne insured or ms legal 
reoresentative snail institute any tegai action for bodily injury against any person or 
organisation egaiiv resoonsiole for the use of 3n automooiie involved m the accident, 
a cooy or tne summons ana ccmotamt or other orocess served >n connection *t;.h sucn 
'egai action snail 0e •orwarcec immediately to the comoany oy the nsured Of h»s legal 
recresenrotue 
4 . T*o ar More Automaoiies—Parts I. M and 111. When :*o :r -nore automobiles are 
.nsurec hereunder the ter^s of 'nis pcncy snan aaoiv seoarateiv fo eacn out an auto-
mcoiie anc a '.nun attached thereto sr.au be neid to oe one autamoaue as 'esoects 
limns "or i.aoii.rv 'jr.cer Par: I af this aoiicv. and seaarate automoaiies unaer Part ill 
cf this aancv inc:ucmg anv cecuct;3ie arcvisions aooncaoie thereto. 
5 . Assistance and Coooeration ol the Insured—Parts I and III. The insured snail 
coocerate "«w tn*» camoanv and. uoon the comoany s reouest. assist m maning settle-
ments, n tne conduct or suits ana m enforcing anv ngnt of contnoutron or indemnity 
3gamst anv oerson or organization wno r.av oe iiaoie to the insured because of Oooiiv 
mjurv. property carnage or toss .vun resaect to wmcn insurance »s aftoraea unaer this 
policy; and 'he insured snail attend hearings and tnais and assist in securing and 
giving evidence 3nc ootammg me attenaance of witnesses, 'he insured snail not. 
exceot at his own cost, voluntarily mane any payment, assume any ooligation or incur 
anv exoense other than for sucn immediate medical anc surgical relief to others as 
snail be tmoerat:ve >t the time of acc:cent. 
Pan IV. After notice of claim under Part IV the comoany mav reauire the insuied 
to taxe sucn action as -nay oe necessarv or aooroonate to preserve his right *o re-
cover damages rrom anv person or organization alleged to oe egaiiv resoonsiole for 
the ooc^v .riurv: ana n anv action against the comoany. the comoanv may reauire 
the insured t: :om cucn oerson or organization as a oarty defendant. 
6 . Acttcn Against Comoany—Part I. No action shall lie against the comoanv uniess. 
as a condition orec2dent thereto, the insured snail have fuily comolied with all the 
terms of this ooiicy. nor until the amount of the insured's obligation to oay shall have 
h^tn finally determined either by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by 
written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the comoany 
Any person or organization or the legal reoresentanve thereof who has secured such 
judgment or written agreement shall thereafter be entitled to recover under this poncy 
to tne extent of the insurance aftoraea by this policy No oerson or organization 
shall have any right under this policy to |0in the comoany as a party to any action 
against the insured to determine the insured's liaoiiity. nor shall trie comoanv be 
imcieaoed by the insured or his legal reoresentanve. Bankruotcy or insolvency at the 
insured or oi the insured's estate snail not relieve the company of any of its obliga-
tions hereunder 
Parts II. Ill and IV. No action snail lie against the comoanv uniess. as a condition 
precedent thereto, there snail have been full compliance with ait the terms ot this 
poncy nor unaer Part Ml. until thirty days after proof of loss is filed and the amount 
or loss is determined as orovided in this ooiicy. 
7 . Medical Reoorts: Proof and Payment of Claim—Part II. As soon as practicable 
the injured oerson or someone on his benalf shall give to the comoany written proor 
ot claim unaer oath if reauired. and shall, after each reauest from the company 
execute authorization to enaoie the comoany to obtain medical reoorts and cooies of 
records. The injured oerson shall submit to pnysical examination bv physicians selected 
by the comoany wnen ano as often as the company may reasonaoiy require. 
The comoany may pay the injured oerson or any person or organization rendering 
the services and sucn payment snail reduce the amount payable nereunder for sucn 
injury Payment hereunder snail not constitute an admission of liability ot any person 
or. exceot hereunder, of the comoanv 
S . Insured's Quues \n Eiem ot loss—Part \\\. \n tne event ot loss the insured shall-
(a) protect the automooile. wnetner or not the loss is covered bv this poncy. and any 
further loss due to it\B insured's failure to protect snail not be recoveraole under 
this policy; reasonaole exoenses incurred m arfording sucn protection shall be 
deemed incurred it the comoany s request: 
(b) promotly notify the oolice if your car is stolent 
t o oermtt us to inspect ana aooraise the oamagea property before its ieoair or disposal: 
(d) tile with the comoanv. *itnm 91 davs after loss, his sworn oroor or loss m sucn 
form ana including such information as tne comoany mav reasonaoiy reauire ana 
shall, uoon the comoany s request, exmbit the damaged property ana suomit to 
examination under oatn. 
9 . Preof 3f iCIaim: Me. ?eoerts— Part IV. As soon as practicable, the m 
other oerson making claim tali give to the comoany written proof ot dair 
oath if required, including full particulars of the nature ano extent of *he 
treatment, and other details entering >nto the determination ot the amount 
The insured and every other person mailing zlstss :hai! susmit to exam-.natro: 
oath by any person named by the comoany ano suoscnoe the same, as offer 
reasonaoiy be required. Proof of claim snail be maoe uoon forms furmsnec 
comoany unless the comoany shall have failed to furmsn sucn forms within 
after receiving] notice of claim. 
The injured person shail suomit to physical examinations by physicians sen 
the comoany wfen and as often as the comoany may 'easonaoiy reauire and i 
the event oi his incapacity ms iegoi reoresentanve. or m the event at *is c 
legal recresenrajtive or the person or persons entitled to sue therefor snaii ua 
request from the comoany execute authorization to enaoie the camcany tc 
medical reports! and copies of records. 
1 0 . AoprauaH-Part 111. If the insured and the camcanv fai 4o agree as 
amount of loss. I either may. within 60 days after proof or 'oss is filed, aemam 
praisa* of the Ittss. In sucn event The insured and the comoany snail eacn 
comoetent aoprjaiser. and the aooraisers snail seiect a camoetent and disin 
umoire. The 30o|raisers snail state seoarately the actual casn value ano the an 
to agree shall suomit their differences to the umoire. An a 
:jwo snail determine the amount of oss. The insured anc 'he : 
snail each aav (jus chosen aooraiser and snail :ear eouany the ether exoense 
aooraisai ana ur^oire. 
I snail not be heid to hove waived anv of .ts 
loss and failing! 
writing of anv 
jnts :v an act ihe camoanyr 
to aooraisai. 
1 1 . Payment of Loss—Parr III. The camcanv mav :av far the :oss .n m-jnevi 
reoair or reoiace the damaged or stolen prooertv-. or may. at anv time ae?cre 
is paid or the orooerty >s so reoiaced. at .ts exoense return 3nv stoien orooert 
named insured, or at its ootion to the address snown in 'he declarations. w»tn ; 
for any resuitanit damage thereto: or mav ta*e ail or sucn aar of the orooerr 
agreed or aooraijsed value out there snail Oe no aoanconment to the camcanv T 
panv mav settle|any claim for loss either with the insured or the owner or the a 
Part IV. Any Amount due is oavaote (a) to the insured or lb) it the insured be 
to his oarent or| guardian, or ( o if the insured be deceased to his surviving 
otherwise id) to a person authorized by law to receive sucn oavment or to i 
legally emitted ito recover the damages whicn tne oavment resresents: provn 
comoany may at its ootion oav anv amount due in accordance with division id! 
12L Ho Benefit to Bailee—Part III. The insurance arforaed oy this Pone/ < 
mure directly or indirectly to the oenerit at any earner or other Oauee tor .in 
for loss ro the ^utomooiie. 
1 3 . Subrogation—P3rts I and 111. !n the event of anv oavment unaer -ms :o 
comoanv snail be suorogatea to ail the insured i rignts of recover/ therercr 
any person or organization ana the insured snail execute and aenver mstrume 
paoers ana do ^natever else is necessarv to secure sucn rignts. The insured 
nothing after loss to prejudice sucn rignts. 
1 4 . Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed bv any agent oi 
other person shall not effect a waiver or a change m anv oart of this ooncv ( 
the comoany from asserting any ngnt unaer the terms of this ooiicy; nor s 
terms of this odlicy be waived or changed, exceot by endorsement issued to 
parr of this policy, signed by a duly authonzea reoresentanve of the comoanv 
1 5 . Assignment. Assignment of interest unaer this policy snail not bina the c 
until its consent is enaorsed hereon: if however the insured named m item 
declarations, orlnis soouse if a resident of the same nousenoid. snail die, trti 
shall cover (I) (he survivor as named insured. (2) his legal reoresentative as 
insured but omf whiie acting within the scooe ot his outies as sucn. (2) any 
having prooer tiemporary custody oi an owned automooiie. as an insured, u 
aooomtment and ouanfication of such legal representative, ana (i) unaer di 
of Parr II any person wno was a relative at the ttme of sucn deatn 
I d . Cancelation. This policy may be cancelea by the insured named in item 
declarations oy Surrender thereof to it\i comoany or any of its authorized as 
by mailing to th^ comoany written notice stating when thereafter the canceiati" 
be effective. This ooiicy may be canceled bv the comoany by mailing to tne 
named in item || of the declarations at the aaaress snown m this ooiicy wnrtei 
stating wnen no< less than ten days thereafter sucn cancelation snail be effeetr 
mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be surficient proof of notice. The time of 
render or the effective date and hour of cancelation stated m the notice shall 
the ena of the policy period. Delivery of such written nonce either by sucn 
or by the comoa|ny snail be eauivalent to mailing. 
\\ sucn insured conuets. earned OTermum snart be comouted in accordance > 
customary snort; rate toole and procedure, it the comoany conceis. earned a 
shail be comout^d oro rata. Premium aoiustmenr may oe made either at the ti 
ceianon is effected or as soon as oracticaoie after cancelation becomes effect 
pavment or tender of unearned premium is not j conaition of cancelation. 
1 7 - Declarations. 3y acceptance of this policy, the insured named in item ] 
declarations agrees that tne statements m tne declarations are ms a*reeme 
representations, that this policy is issued m reliance uoon the truth of sue: 
semations and that this poncy emoodies all agreements existing aetween mmt 
the comoany or any ot its agents relating to this insurance. 
la Witness Whereof, the comqany has caused this policy to be signed by its president and secretary, Hut this policy shall not be valid unless comoieted by the atta 
hereto or a declarations page designated as Part Two and countersigned on the aforesaid declarations page by a duly authorized reoresentative of the company. 
The insured is hereby notified that by virtue of this policy he is a member of the Bear River Mutual Insurance Comoanv and that the annual meeting of the comoani 
at the home orfice m iait Lake Giy. Utan, on tt\t first Saturoay in Marcn of eacn year, at 11:00 a.m. for the ouroose of transacting the general business ot the camoanv 
tne election or airectors. As a policyholder you are entitled to vote m person at the meeting or by proxy. This notice snail be deemed full nonce of the annual me« 
Rev. 1 
Secretary 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT 6r'UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
CLARENCE H. SCOW, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corooration, 
d/b/a FARMERS INSURANCE 
GROUP, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Civil No: C-80-01211 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and 
defendant's motion for summary judgment were orally arguied 
on August 13, 1980. Plaintiff was represented by Robert^  c. 
Fillerup. Defendant was represented by Don J. Hanson. 
Following the hearing, the court took the matter under advise-
ment and has since reviewed the memoranda of counsel and various 
of the authorities cited. Based on 'the foregoing, the court 
renders the following decision. 
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Onj March 
1, 1976, plaintiff purchased an automobile insurance policy 
from defendant for a 1970 Ford truck. The expiration daite of 
the policy was December 24, 1976. On March 22, 1976, plaintiff 
purchased another automobile insurance policy from defendant 
for a 1972 Chevrolet automobile. The expiration date oi this 
second policy was June 30, 1976. Both policies provided 
personal injury protection (no-fault coverage) and uninsured 
motorist coverage. 
On April 20, 1976, an automobile driven by Wade J. 
Sellers collided with plaintiff who was riding a motorcycle. 
Plaintiff owned this motorcycle but had not purchased a separate 
insurance policy for it. 
Plaintiff brought a suit for personal injuries against 
tfade Sellers in June, 1976. During the course of that dase it 
was discovered that Sellers was uninsured. After this discovery, 
plaintiff contacted Farmers Insurance Company and requested 
uninsured motorist coverage under his two automobile insurance 
policies. In addition, plaintiff requested that defendant 
enter the lawsuit against Sellers to protect its interest. 
For reasons not material to this decision, defendant denied 
plaintiff's requests. 
Subsequently, plaintiff again made demand upon 
defendant to provide coverage, including personal injury 
protection (PIP) payments. Defendant again denied coverage. 
Following this second denial, a stipulated judgment was 
entered against Wade J. Sellers in the amount of $30,000.00. 
A finding of fact was also made that Sellers was an uninsured 
motorist. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the present action 
seeking, among other things, PIP payments and uninsured 
motorist benefits. 
ff if the axclus^mvtrt 
to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying an automobile or 2 wheel motor 
vehicle (other than an insured motor 
vehicle) owned by a named insured or any 
relative resident in the sa~e household, 
• or through being struck by such vehicles. 
Plaintiff has cited numerous cases for the majority position that 
this exclusion is void as against public policy. See, for example, 
Federated American Insurance Co. v. Haynes, 88 Wash. 2d 439, 563 
P.2d 815 (1977); Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975); State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hinkel, 488 P.2d 1151 (Nev. 1971). 
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that the exclusion is void as against public policy, it:'."|6iflftj 
in conflict with the Motor Vehicle Safety^ Responsibility: Apt/ 
Utah Code Ann. S 41-12-1 et sea., and particularly 41-12^21*& 
which, as material to this case/ provides^ 
. . . [N]o automobile liability insurance 
policy insuring against loss resulting 
from liability imposed by law for bodily 
injury or death or property damage suffered 
by any person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall 
be delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed 
in this state, . . . unless coverage is 
provided in such policy or a supplement to 
it, in limits for bodily injury or death 
set forth in Section 41-12-5 . . . for the 
protection of persons insured thereunder 
who are legally entitled to recover damages 
from owners or operators of uninsured motor 
vehicle and hit-and-run motor vehicles 
because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. 
Plaintiff also argues that he is entitled to the maximum 
uninsured motorist benefits under each of the separate policies 
issued by defendant. Defendant argues to the contrary ajid 
principally relies upon Condition 8, contained in each pblicy, 
which provides: 
With respect to any occurrence, accident or 
loss to which this and any other insurance 
policy or policies issued to the insured by th^ 
Company also apply, no payment shall be made 
hereunder which, when added to any amount 
paid or payable under such other insurance 
policy or policies, would result in a total 
payment to the insured or other person in 
excess of the highest applicable limits of 
liability under any one such policy. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that the wording of this conditioh operates 
to limit his recovery but contends that it violates the Uninsured 
motorist statute. While an emerging majority view agrea^ with 
plaintiff's position and allows stacking of insurance policies, 
this court is bound to follow Utah law in this case and 
therefore holds that stacking is impermissible. Martin y. 
Christensen. 22 Utah 2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969). 
The third issue to be resolved is whether plaintiff 
is entitled to no-fault benefits from the defendant. Section 
-3-
31-41-6 of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act provides: 
(1) Every insurance policy or other 
security complying with the requirements 
of subsection (1)*of Section 31-41-5 shall 
provide personal injury protection providing 
for payments to the insured and to all other 
persons suffering personal injury arising 
out of an accident involving any motor vehicle 
. . . (emphasis added) ' 
Under § 31-41-10(a) (i), an insurer may exclude benefits for 
"injury sustained by the injured while occupying another motor 
vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy 
. . . " "Motor vehicle" is defined in § 31-41-3 as "any 
vehicle cf a kind to be registered under Title 41, but excluding, 
however motorcycles." 
This review of the Act reveals that motorcycles have 
been excluded from the definition of motor vehicle. As a result, 
the exclusion provided in § 31-41-10 does not apply to plaintiff 
because he was not occupying "another motor vehicle" owned by 
him at the time of the accident. However, the accident in which 
plaintiff was injured, was one involving "any motor vehicle" as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-6 (i.e. the automobile driven 
by Sellers). A similar analysis of the PIP endorsement of the 
policy issued by defendant reaches the same result. The court 
therefore holds that the exclusions set forth at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31-41-10(a)(i) and in the PIP endorsement are not applicable 
and that plaintiff is entitled to coverage for no-fault benefits. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff is entitled to uninsured 
motorist benefits under the policies issued by defendant up to 
$15,000.00. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is entitled to 
coverage for no-fault benefits under the policies issued by 
defendant. 
All other issues not disposed of by this order are 
-4-
reserved for trial. 
Dated this day of August, 1980. 
\\dmdL<r$&^) 
David K. Winder ~ 7" 
United States District Court 
Mailed a copy of the forecoing Order to the following 
named counsel this J!/ ~~ day of August, 198 0. 
Robert C. Fillerup, Esc. 
1325 South 800 East 
Suite 305 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Don J. Hanson, Esq. 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^dL> &/-*t£AJ 
Secretary 
<»T7s37: A TRUE COPY 
MMiC^i L 3 A 3f , l :n , CLERK 
J W
™ a^TeS CISTRIC7 COURT 
_ DISTRICT OF UTAH 
BY .- 'M/UJ (L,^.,'Lf,^v^ 
'DEPUTY CLERK 
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be transferred from the county where filed 
to Maricopa County. A.R.S. § 12-824 (re-
numbered as A.R.S. § 12-822 by Laws 
1984, Ch. 285, § 7); State v. Superior Court 
in and for the County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 
273, 585 P,2d 882 (1978). The argument is 
advanced that a plaintiff need not wait for 
a demand by the Attorney General but 
should be able, in the first instance, to file 
the action against the state in Maricopa 
County. If the action against the state 
was properly brought in Maricopa County, 
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-401(7) it was prop-
er for the action to be maintained against 
the other defendants in Maricopa County. 
The defendants contend that the state 
was never a proper party to this action 
because the state was immune from liabili-
ty pursuant to A.R.S. § 26-314. Since the 
state was never a proper party the resi-
dence of the other defendants was the only 
proper consideration. See Turner v. Supe-
rior Court, 3 Ariz.App. 414, 415 P.2d 129 
(1966). 
The arguments raised by the parties 
need not be resolved in this action. The 
relevant consideration for the trial judge 
was whether there was good cause to set 
aside the dismissal and allow the plaintiff 
GRL additional time to pay the required 
fee. See Lemons, 141 Ariz, at 505-06, 687 
P.2d at 1260-61. The record shows that 
there was not a specific finding that the 
action was filed in the wrong county. The 
Maricopa County trial judge referred to 
A.R.S. § 12-407 in his order granting a 
change of venue, but that section is not 
limited to changes of venue for filing in the 
wrong county. We are not certain what 
the trial judge had in mind in granting the 
change of venue. Under the state of the 
record we believe that there was sufficient 
confusion to justify the superior court 
judge's decision to allow the plaintiff addi-
tional time to file the required fee. 
While we may question the judgment of 
counsel in allowing this case to be placed in 
jeopardy over the payment of a twenty 
dollar fee, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the actions of the trial judge. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is 
vacated, and the relief sought by petition-
ers in their special action is denied. 
GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS, JAMES 
DUKE CAMERON and FELDMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
144 Ariz. 291 
Jack CALVERT, Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF ARIZONA, Defendant/Appellee. 
No. 17675-PR. 
Supreme Court of Arizona, 
In Banc. 
March 13, 1985. 
Insured brought declaratory judgment 
action against insurer arising out of his 
son's death in accident caused by negli-
gence of an uninsured motorist, and follow-
ing insurer's refusal to pay claim for unin-
sured motorist benefits under vehicle liabil-
ity policy. The Superior Court, Pima Coun-
ty, Michael J. Brown, J., granted insurer's 
motion for summary judgment, and the 
Court of Appeals, 697 P.2d 707, reversed. 
On petition for review, the Supreme Court, 
Gordon, V.C.J., held that exclusion denying 
coverage to an insured injured by an unin-
sured motorist while insured is occupying 
vehicle owned by insured but not listed in 
policy is invalid as contrary to coverage 
mandated by statute which controls unin-
sured motorist protection. 
Opinion of Court of Appeals vacated; 
case reversed and remanded. 
CALVERT v. FARMERS INS. CO. OF ARIZONA Ariz. 685 
Cite as 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985) 
1. Statutes G=181(l) 
Cardinal rule of statutory interpreta-
tion is to determine and give effect to legis-
lative intent behind the statute. 
2. Statutes <3=>181(2), 184 
In determining legislature's intent in 
enacting statute, Supreme Court will look 
to policy behind statute and evil which it 
was designed to remedy, as well as to the 
words, context, subject matter, and effects 
and consequences of the statute. 
3. Insurance <3=467.51(1) 
Uninsured motorist statute is remedial 
and therefore should be liberally construed 
in order to carry out intent of legislature. 
A.R.S. § 20-259.01. 
4. Insurance <s»467.51(3) 
Exclusion denying coverage to an in-
sured injured by an uninsured motorist 
while insured is occupying vehicle owned 
by insured but not listed in policy is invalid 
as contrary to coverage mandated by stat-
ute which controls uninsured motorist pro-
tection; overruling Owens v. Allied Mutu-
al Insurance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181, 
487 P.2d 402, Chambers v. Owens, 22 Ariz. 
App. 175, 525 P.2d 306, and Rodriguez v. 
Maryland Indemnity Insurance Compa-
ny, 24 Ariz.App. 392, 539 P.2d 196. A.R.S. 
§ 20-259.01. 
Miller & Pitt by John L. Tully, Tucson, 
for plaintiff/appellant. 
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Redhair by 
D.B. Udall, Tucson, for defendant/appellee. 
GORDON, Vice Chief Justice: 
Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona 
(defendant) petitioned this Court for review 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
Calvert v. Farmers Insurance Company 
of Arizona, — Ariz. — , (>97 P.2d 707 
(1984) which struck down an "other vehi-
cle" exclusion clause as violative of the 
public policy' underlying Arizona's Unin-
sured Motorists Act (hereafter referred to 
*• The policy defines "family member" as a per-
son related to [the named insured] by blood, 
marriage or adoption who is a resident of 
as the "Act" or "Statute"), A.R.S. § 20-
259.01. We granted review in this case to 
settle a conflict in the Court of Appeals 
decisions concerning the validity of "other 
vehicle" exclusion clauses in uninsured mo-
torist coverage. We have jurisdiction pur-
suant to Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and 
Ariz.R.Civ.App.P. 23. 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. 
On January 3, 1983, Michael Calvert, age 
18, while operating a motorcycle was 
struck and fatally injured by an uninsured 
motor vehicle. The collision was caused by 
the negligence of the uninsured motorist. 
At the time of the accident, Jack Calvert, 
Michael's father and plaintiff in this case, 
was the named insured under a motor vehi-
cle liability insurance policy issued by 
Farmers Insurance Company of Arizona 
(hereafter referred to as "Farmers"). 
Subsequent to his son's death, Jack Cal-
vert made a claim upon Farmers for unin-
sured motorist benefits. Calvert's insur-
ance policy contained $30,000 in uninsured 
motorist coverage. Part II of the policy 
states the coverage for uninsured motorist: 
"We will pay damages for bodily inju-
ry which an insured person is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. 
The bodily injury must be caused by 
accident and arise out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of the uninsured 
motor vehicle." (emphasis in original) 
Michael Calvert was a resident of his 
father's household at the time of the acci-
dent and consequently an "insured person" 
under the terms of the Farmers' uninsured 
motorist coverage: 
"As used in this Part: 
"1. Insured person means: 
"a. You or a family member.1 
"b. Any other person while occupy-
ing your insured car. 
* * * " (emphasis in original) 
Farmers conceded that Michael was an 
insured under the policy but denied Jack 
[named insured] household, including a ward or 
foster child. 
686 Ariz. 697 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Calvert's claim for uninsured motorist ben-
efits on the basis of an "other vehicle" 
exclusion clause contained in the uninsured 
motorist section of the policy, which reads: 
"This coverage does not apply to bodily 
injury sustained by a person: 
"1. While occupying a motor vehicle 
owned by you or a family member for 
which insurance is not afforded under 
this policy or through being struck by 
that motor vehicle." (emphasis in origi-
nal) 
Farmers took the position that the exclu-
sion applied because Michael Calvert sus-
tained his fatal injuries while driving a 
motorcycle that was owned by either Mi-
chael or his father but that was not insured 
under the policy. 
A short time later, Jack Calvert brought 
a Declaratory Judgment action against 
Farmers seeking a declaration that the 
"other vehicle" exclusion clause contained 
in the uninsured motorist coverage was 
invalid and unenforceable. The parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment. 
Concluding that the policy did not provide 
uninsured motorist coverage for the acci-
dent in this case, the trial court granted 
Farmers' motion for summary judgment 
and denied plaintiffs. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that the "other ve-
hicle" exclusion clause in the Farmers' in-
surance policy violated the public policy 
underlying Arizona's Uninsured Motorist 
Statute, A.R.S. § 20-259.01. 
YT£agS£ Wittr the Court of Appeals thpt 
the^Farmers' "other vehicle" exclusionary 
provision contravenes the policy underlying 
o w l u l f i i u ^ We vacate 
the Court of Appeals' opinion, however, to 
fully explain our reasoning. 
The problems caused by the financially 
irresponsible and uninsured motorist date 
back to the advent of the mass produced 
automobile and ultimately prompted our 
Legislature to enact the'Uninsured Motor-
ist Act, A.R.S. § 20-259.01. See Austin & 
Risjord, The Problem of the Financially 
Irresponsible Motorist, 24 U.Kansas City 
L.Rev. 82 (1955); Ward, The Uninsured 
Motorist' National and International 
Protection Presently Available and Com-
parative Problems in Substantial Simi-
lanty, 9 Buffalo LRev. ^83-320 (1960); 
Murphy & Netherton, Public Responsibili-
ty and Uninsured Motorist, 47 George-
town L.J. 700 (1959); Collins, Implementa-
tion of Public Policy Against the Finan-
cially Irresponsible Motorist, 19 Brooklyn 
L.Rev. 11 (1952); see alsol A. Widiss, A 
Guide to Uninsured Motqrist Coverage 
(1969). Consequently, our Uninsured Mo-
torist statute mandates th4t coverage be 
provided to insure againstj bodily injury 
caused by uninsured motorists: 
"§ 20-259.01. Motor vehicle liability 
policy; uninsurance required; underin-
surance optional; definitions; subroga-
tion 
"A. No automobile liability or motor 
vehicle liability policy injuring against 
loss resulting from liability imposed by 
law for bodily injury or ideath suffered 
by any person arising oui of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use qf a motor vehi-
cle shall be delivered or iisued for deliv-
ery in this state, with respect to any 
motor vehicle registered or principally 
garaged in this state, unless coverage is 
provided in the policy or Supplemental to 
the policy, in limits for iiodily injury or 
death prescribed in subs^ctiozi B of this 
section, but not less than! the limits pre-
scribed in § 28-1102, ur^ der provisions 
filed with and approved $y the director, 
for the protection of persons insured who 
are legally entitled to rdcover damages 
from owners or operatorfs of uninsured 
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death, re-
sulting therefrom. For the purposes of 
the coverage provided for pursuant to 
this section, 'uninsured motor vehicles', 
subject to the terms anji conditions of 
such coverage, includes iny insured mo-
tor vehicle if the liability insurer of the 
vehicle is unable to make payment on the 
liability of its insured, within the limits 
of the coverage, because of insolvency." 
Since § 20-259.01 controlsj the i i n i & u ^ 
motorist protection mandated ii*Amon%to 
resolve this case we must interpret this 
CALVERT v. FARMERS 
Cite as 697 P.2d 
statute and determine whetHer ft autEo-
rizes an "other vehicle" exclusion. This^is 
ajnnrtter of statutory construction 
[1,2] The cardinal rule of statutory in-
terpretation is to determine and give effect 
to the legislative intent behind the statute. 
Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Burns, 96 
Ariz. 332, 395 P.2d 532 (1964); Payne v. 
Knox, 94 Ariz. 380, 385 P.2d 514 (1963). In 
determining the Legislature's intent in en-
acting a statute, this Court will look to the 
policy behind the statute and the evil which 
it was designed to remedy. Cohen v. 
State, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978); 
City of Mesa v. Salt River Project Agr. 
Imp. & Power District, 92 Ariz. 91, 373 
P.2d 722 (1962). Additionally, we will look 
to the words, context, subject matter, and 
effects and consequences of the statute. 
State ex rel. Flournoy v. Mangum, 113 
Ariz. 151, 548 P.2d 1148 (1976). 
[3] Our uninsured motorist statute es-
tablishes a public policy that every insured 
is entitled to recover damages he or she 
would have been able to recover if the 
uninsured had maintained a policy of liabili-
ty insurance in a solvent company. Trans-
portation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 
475 P.2d 253 (1970); Dairyland Ins. Co. v. 
Lopez, 22 Ariz.App. 309, 526 P.2d 1264 
, (1974). The statute is remedial, and shouhi 
be liberally construed in order to carry^out 
the intent of theLegislatujj. Williams v. 
Williams, 23 Ariz.App. 191, 531 P.2d 924 
(1975); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Staats, 9 Ariz. 
App. 410, 453 P.2d 239 (1969). TbW pwcpm 
of the statute is to afford protectiotPto 
victims of financially irresponsible drivers^ 
Evenchik v. State Farm Ins. Co., 139 Ariz. 
453, 679 P.2d 99 (App.1984); see Geyer v. 
Reserve Ins. Co., 8 Ariz.App. 464, 447 P.2d 
556 (1968). 
[4] We believe that IBfe exclusion pro^s? 
sion in this case contravenes the pubij£ 
Policy underlying the Uninsured Motor^t 
Act The Act-mandates that every pfolicy 
issued have at least the minimum limits &r 
uninsured motorist protection. In Arizdffc, 
such coverage is not voluntary as in otter 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the statujp* 
does not contain numerous exceptions v» 
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coverage as in the uninsured motorist stat-
ltfes of other jurisdictions. 
The only exception to the mandatory re-
quirement of uninsured motorist protection 
under the Act is contained in A.R.S. § 20-
259.01(D), which expressly excludes vehi-
cles "used as public or livery conveyances 
or rented to others or which are used in the 
business primarily to transport property or 
equipment" If the Legislature had intend-
ed to include additional exclusions, such as 
an "other vehicle" exclusion, it would have 
expressly done so. Cf McClellan v. Sen-
try Indemnity Co., 140 Ariz. 558, 683 P.2d 
757 (App.1984) (government owned vehicle 
exclusion). 
CSigepKi^ strong pub-
lic policy mandating coverage for innocent 
victims from tragic negligent acts of' uffin-
sureds, we will not construe the uninsured 
mj2$tj|3jftj^^ when it 
is silent on "other vehicle" exclusions. 
TJua conclusion is in accord with the vast 
majority of jurisdictions that Save deitt 
wit&Itliis issue? About twenty-six states 
have held that an "other vehicle" exclusion 
clause similar to the one herein violates the 
public policy underlying their respective 
uninsured motorist statutes. See Richards 
v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 122 
Wis.2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985); Lin-
dahl v. Howe, 345 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1984); 
Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 188 Conn. 
245, 449 A.2d 157 (1982); Jacobson v. Im-
plement Dealer Mut. Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 
908 (Mont.1982); Bradley v. Mid-Century 
Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141 
(1980); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Williams, 481 Pa. 130, 392 A.2d 281 (1978); 
Kau v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 58 
Hawaii 49, 564 P.2d 443 (1977); Beek v. 
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 73 N.J. 185, 373 
A.2d 654 (1977), affirming the lower court 
decision reported at 135 NJ.Super. 1, 342 
A.2d 547 (App.Div.1975); Cothren v. Em-
casco Ins. Co., 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla.1976); 
Chavez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975); Nygaard 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 301 
Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151 (1974); 
Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
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157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974); 
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 
Ala. 218, 292 So.2d 95 (1974); Hogan v. 
Home Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890 
(1973); Lowery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 285 So.2d 767 (Miss.1973); Tou-
chette v. Northwestern Mut. Iris. Co., 80 
Wash.2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 87 
Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971); Muilis v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 
229 (Fla.1971); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 
207 Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222 (1967); Bar-
nett v. Crosby, 5 Kan.App.2d 98, 612 P.2d 
1250(1980); Pennsylvania Nat'lMut. Cas-
ualty Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 
416 A.2d 734 (App.1980); Otto v. Farmers 
Ins. Co., 558 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.App.1977); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Robert-
son. 156 Ind.App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626 
(1973); Bass v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 128 Ga.App. 285, 196 S.E.2d 485, 
affd. 231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444 (1973); 
Elledge v. Warren, 263 So.2d 912 (La.App. 
1972); Doxtater v. State Farm MuL Auto. 
Ins. Co., 8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284 
(1972); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 2 Cal. 
App.3d 1067, 83 Cal.Rptr. 156 (1969) (The 
California legislature has since amended 
the California statute to permit this type of 
exclusion, see Cal.Ins.Code § 11580.2 (West 
Supp.1984)); Stephens v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 
1975); see also A. Widiss, A Guide to Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage, § 2.9 (1969 & 
Supp.1981); Annot, 30 A.L.R.4th 172 
(1984). We have carefully read these 
cases, and although the uninsured motorist 
statutes of the other states are not identi-
cal to the Arizona statute, we can find no 
important distinction among them. We 
find these cases highly persuasive. 
Farmers relies on a Court of Appeals 
decision, Owens v. Allied Mutual Insur-
ance Company, 15 Ariz.App. 181, 487 P.2d 
402 (1971), which found an "other vehicle" 
exclusion clause to be reasonable. We find 
the reasoning supporting this decision un-
persuasive.2 
2. Additionally, Farmers relies on Chambers v. 
Owens, 22 Ariz.App. 175, 525 P.2d 306 (1974) 
and Rodriguez v. Maryland Indent. Ins. Co., 24 
Arizj^pp. 392, 539 P.2d 196 (1975) which are the 
First, the three cases relied upon by the 
court in Owens have subsequently been 
effectively overruled: Rushing v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 216 So.2d 875 (La.App.1968) over-
ruled by Elledge v. Warren, supra; Na-
tional Union Indem. Co. v. Hodges, 238 
So.2d 673 (Fla.App.1970) overruled by Mui-
lis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
supra; McElyea v. Safeway Ins. Co., 131 
IU.App.2d 452, 266 N.E.2d 146 (1970) over-
ruled by Doxtator v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., supra. These jurisdictions 
are now aligned with the majority, which 
consider "other vehicle" exclusion clauses 
invalid. 
Second, the Court of Appeals found 
"nothing in the statute which prevents an 
insurer from withholding protection from 
an insured while he is driving an uninsured 
vehicle owned by him." We believe, how-
ever, that the statute's silejice on "other 
vehicle" exclusions militates against the va-
lidity of such an exclusion. 
The purpose of our statute J is to close the 
gap in protection under the Safety Respon-
sibility Act, A.R.S. § 28-1101 et seq., by 
requiring insurance companies issuing 
automobile liability policies tio provide the 
insured with financial protection against 
uninsured motorists for bodily injury suf-
fered due to the negligence of such individ-
uals. Chase v. State Farm Mut Auto. 
Ins. Co., 131 Ariz. 461, 641 P,2d 1305 (App. 
1982); Balestrieri v. Hartfofd Ace. & In-
dem. Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.App. £55, 526 P.2d 
779 (1974). The statute does not contem-
plate a piecemeal whittling away at the 
liability protection for injuries caused by 
uninsured motorists. See Touchette v. 
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Mui-
lis- v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
supra; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Hinkel, supra; Allstate Ins. Cb. v. Meeks, 
supra. As noted above, an express provi-
sion in § 20-259.01 authorizing "other vehi-
cle" exclusions in uninsured motorist cover-
age could easily have been incorporated 
progeny of Owens and based on the same rea-
soning. Our disposal of Owens disposes of 
these two cases»aiso. 
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into the statute by the Legislature. Thus, 
we will leave the matter to the Legislature 
to expressly authorize an "other owned" 
vehicle exclusion in the statute. Cf. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, su-
pra; Aetna his. Co. v. Hurst, supra.3 
Third, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that, without the exclusion, an insured 
would be able to purchase one liability poli-
cy on one owned vehicle and claim unin-
sured motorist protection for himself and 
others while driving any number of other 
uninsured automobiles also owned by him. 
Initially we note that the same argument 
. has been made in other cases and rejected. 
See Nygaard v. State Farm Mut Auto. 
Ins. Co., supra; Elledge v. Warren, su-
pra; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Hinkel, supra. See also A. Widiss, A 
Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
§ 2.9 (1969). The court in Hinkel, in con-
struing Nevada's uninsured motorist stat-
ute, answered this argument, stating: 
"If our Legislature had intended to 
prevent an owner of two motor vehicles 
from paying for insurance on only one 
and recovering benefits for his injuries 
sustained while operating the other, it 
could have followed the lead of the legis-
latures in some of the other jurisdictions 
and limited the coverage by providing 
that N.R.S. 693.115(1) did not apply to 
bodily injury suffered by the insured 
while occupying a motor vehicle owned 
by him, unless the occupied vehicle was 
an insured motor vehicle. Such an 
amendment would be the prerogative and 
responsibility of the legislature and not 
,. the function of this court." 
87 Nev. at 483, 488 P.2d at 1154. 
Furthermore, our^tlhmsnred- Motoris^ 
Act was created "for the protection of per* 
sons*" M& ni&iSr the protection of Jiie 
insured vehicle. AR.S. § 20-259.01. See 
Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., supra; 
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra; 
3- The Court of Appeals also noted that the exclu-
sionary clause had been filed with and approved 
by the Insurance Director pursuant to A.R.S. 
§ 20-259.01. Such acquiescence, however, does 
not divest this Court of its duty to give the 
statute its ultimate authoritative interpretation. 
See Lindahl v. Howe, supra. 
Otto v. Farmers Ins. Co., supra. This 
Court recognized this fact in Wade, stating: 
"The Legislature intended the Finan-
cial Responsibility Act to protect the gen-
eral public against the individual, finan-
cially irresponsible motorist. On the oth-
er hand the Uninsured Motorist law com-
pels the carriers to provide economic pro-
tection for the insured individual 
against the financially irresponsible seg-
ment of the driving public. The former 
is for the public in general and the latter 
for the individuals who have the fore-
sight to protect themselves against the 
public." (emphasis added) 
106 Ariz, at 273; 475 P.2d at 257. There is 
nothing in our uninsured motorist statute 
which limits coverage depending on the 
location or status of the insured. Thus, 
our uninsured motorist protection is porta-
ble. The insured and family members in-
sured are covered not only when occupying 
an insured vehicle, but also when in anoth-
er automobile, when on foot,4 when on a 
bicycle or when sitting on a porch. Brad-
ley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., supra; Mul-
lis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
supra; Elledge v. Warren, supra; Jacob-
son v. Implement Dealer Mut Ins. Co., 
supra; Richards v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., supra. Any gaps in unin-
sured motorist protection dependent on lo-
cation of the insured should be sanctioned 
by the Legislature and not by this Court. 
Farmers contends that the Legislature 
has impliedly approved of the judicial inter-
pretation of "other vehicle" exclusions by 
Owens and progeny by reenacting the Un-
insured Motorist Act in substantially the 
same language with knowledge of the hold-
ings of these cases. Farmers cites for this 
proposition Cagle v. Butcher, 118 Ariz. 
122, 575 P.2d 321 (1978) and Jackson v. 
Northland Construction Co., I l l Ariz. 
387, 531 P.2d 144 (1975). Cagle and Jack-
son state that when a statute construed by 
4. We note that the illustration in the Farmers' 
policy directly below the heading "Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage" depicts an injured pedestri-
an sprawled on the road after being struck by 
what appears to be a hit and run automobile, an 
uninsured motor vehicle. 
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a court of last resort is reenacted in sub-
stantially the same terms, the Legislature 
is presumed to have approved the judicial 
construction and to have adopted such con-
struction for the reenactment of the stat-
ute. Owens and progeny, however, were 
decided by the Court of Appeals, and not 
the court of last resort in this state, the 
Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, this princi-
ple has no application to the case at bar.5 
Furthermore, that the Legislature has 
amended the statute does not mean the 
Legislature has considered and adopted the 
court's judicial interpretation concerning 
the statute. There is no indication of any 
legislative action concerning other vehicle 
exclusions. We have searched the general 
index for the House and Senate for a bill 
introduced to the Legislature since the en-
actment of the Uninsured Motorist Act con-
cerning other vehicle exclusions and have 
found none. See General Index: The Jour-
nal of the House of Representatives (1965-
84); General Index: Journal of the Senate 
(1965-84); Cf. Hosogai v. Kadata, — 
Ariz. — , (1985) [No. 17665—PR filed Feb-
ruary 20,1985.] We can only infer from the 
legislative action taken since the inception 
of the Act that the Legislature has con-
siderable concern regarding the uncom-
pensated injuries inflicted by the un-
insured motorist. This inference is com-
pelled by several legislative amendments to 
§ 20-259.01 which effectively expand rath-
er than limit the scope of coverage provided 
by the Act. Cf. Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 
Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983) (legislative 
enactment of A.R.S. § 4-244 and of new 
and stringent laws pertaining to the pun-
ishment of drunk drivers shows legisla-
ture's concern for damage done by drunk 
drivers); Brannigan v. Raybucky 136 Ariz. 
513, 516, 667 P.2d 213 (1983) (accord). In 
1970, the Act was amended to cover in-
sureds injured by motorists whose vehicles 
were uninsured by reason of insolvency, 
thus increasing the class of uninsured vehi-
cles. 1970 Ariz.Sess.Laws 195, ch. 80 § 1. 
In 1972, the Act was amended making un-
insured motorist protection mandatory, 
5. Although the Petition for Review was denied 
in both Chambers and Rodriguez, such a denial 
of review does not mean we accepted the Court 
1972 Ariz.Sess.Law 1140, ch. 157 § 1, and 
in 1981, uunderinsured motorist" protection 
was added. 1981 Ariz.Sess.Law 731, ch. 
224 § 1. We, therefore, must construe the 
Act until such a time as thQ Legislature 
sees fit to voice an opinion on the subject 
matter. 
We TKIM tlfet tiSe exclusion denying cov-
erage to an insured injured by an unin-
sured motorist while the insured is occupy, 
ing^  a vehicle owned by the insured but not 
listed in the policy is invalid as being con--
trarj tcLthe coverage mandated by A.R.S. 
§"20-259.01. The opinion of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated. The Oufens, Cham-
bers and Rodriguez cases aife overruled. 
This case is reversed and reminded to the 
trial court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
HOLOHAN, C.J., and HAYS and CAM-
ERON, JJ., concur. 
Note: Justice STANLEY G. FELDMAN 
did not participate in the determination of 
this matter. 
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The SUPERIOR COURT of ihe State of 
Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF 
MARICOPA, Barry G. Silverman, 
Judge of the Superior Court, Sandra L. 
Huston and Kenneth E. Huston, Real 
Parties In Interest, and Valley National 
Bank, Respondents. 
No. 17773-SA. 
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March 28, 1985. 
Creditor filed motion fop judgment 
against garnishee. The Superior Court, 
of Appeals' legal analysis or conclusion in those 
cases. Denial of a petition for review has no 
precedential value. 
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amination. This Court held that such rules 
were invalid because they exceeded the ex-
press grant of rulemaking authority con-
ferred upon the board by statute. "Admin-
istrative agencies, of course, have only 
those powers specifically conferred upon 
them by the legislature." 594 P.2d at 332. 
Any rule promulgated by an administrative 
agency that is "out of harmony" with the 
enabling statute will be void. In Bell, we 
said: 
"The courts have uniformly held that ad-
ministrative regulations are 'out of har-
mony' with legislative guidelines if they: 
(1) 'engraft additional and contradictory 
requirements on the statute' (citing 
cases); or (2) 'if they engraft additional, 
noncontradictory requirements on the 
statute which were not envisioned by the 
legislature.' (citing cases)." 594 P.2d at 
333. 
In Brd. of Barbers, we considered a factu-
al situation somewhat similar to the present 
case. In that case, the statute provided 
that an applicant serve a one-year appren-
ticeship before being eligible for licensure 
as a barber. By rule, the board added to 
this statutory condition a requirement that 
the one year apprenticeship must include at 
least six months in a "commercial barber-
shop." We held that the rule imposed an 
additional requirement not envisioned by 
the legislature and was invalid. 
Similarly, courts in other states have 
stricken administrative rules which have 
added conditions for licensure under grand-
father clauses. See Bloom v. Texas State 
Bd. of Exam, of Psychologists (Tex. 1973), 
492 S.W.2d 460; and Whittle v. St Bd. of 
Examiners of Psychologists (Okla.1971), 483 
P.2d 328. 
The board here has promulgated a rule 
clearly imposing an additional requirement 
not envisioned by the legislature. The stat-
ute requires a master's degree and five 
years of professional experience, and pre-
scribes no chronological order in which 
these requirements must be met. The leg-
islature knew how to prescribe such a 
chronological order. In section 37-17-
302(2)(e), which deals with the qualifica-
tions of applicants not within the grandfa-
ther clause, the statute requires two years 
of professional experience and that "One 
year of this experience shall be post doctor-
al." The legislature clearly chose not to 
impose a chronological requirement in the 
grandfather clause. 
The board is statutorily charged with re-
viewing the character of an applicants pro-
fessional experience. In its reliance upon 
this rule, the board failed to examine the 
character of McPhail's experience. Instead, 
it denied him a license by promulgation of a 
rule "out of harmonjp with the grandfather 
clause. 
We reverse the judgment of the District 
Court and order that the case be remanded 
to the board so chat it may consider 
McPhail's application on the merits of his 
professional experience both before and af-
ter he received his master's degree. 
HASWELL, C.J., knd DALY, SHEEHY 
and WEBER, JJ., concur. 
Helen JACOBSON arid Elva J. Dike, Per-
sonal Representatives of the Estate of 
Sammy D. Harlan, Plaintiff and Respon-
dent, 
IMPLEMENT DEALERS MUTUAL IN-
SURANCE CO. and Kenneth Heimer, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 81^226. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted Dec 1, 1981. 
Decided Feb 17, 1982. 
Personal representatives of estate of 
deceased insured brought action against in-
surer to enforce uninsured motorist cover-
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age of automobile liability insurance policy 
issued by insurer. The District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, 
James B. Wheelis, P. J., granted summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defend-
ant insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Daly, J., held that policy's exclusion, which 
provided that policy did not apply to bodily 
injury to insured while occupying automo-
bile, other than insured automobile, owned 
by named insured, was invalidated by Mon-
tana's mandatory uninsured motorist cover-
age statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <®=>467.51(3) 
Automobile liability insurance policy's 
exclusion, which provided that policy did 
not apply to bodily injury to insured while 
occupying automobile, other than insured 
automobile, owned by named insured, was 
invalidated by Montana's mandatory unin-
sured motorist coverage statute, as such 
exclusion was violation of public policy be-
hind such statute of protecting policyhold-
ers from uninsured motorists in all instanc-
es and tried to limit scope of coverage man-
dated by such statute. MCA 33-23-201. 
2. Insurance <s=»467.51(2) 
All waivers of uninsured motorist cov-
erage are not improper, but waiver must be 
expressed.. fciy insured in manner that is 
clear, concise and equitable to both parties 
involved in insurance contract. 
3. Insurance e=>467.51(3) 
Where automobile liability insurance 
policy's exclusion clause, which provided 
that policy did not apply to bodily injury to 
insured while occupying automobile, other 
than insured automobile, owned by named 
insured, was lost ip myriad of verbiage that 
made up insurance contract, and would be 
unnoticeable by average policyholder, such 
exclusion clause could never constitute ex-
press waiver of uninsured motorist cover-
age. 
Worden, Thane & Haines, Robert J. Phil-
lips, Missoula, for defendant and appellant 
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Garlingtcn, Lohn & Robinson, Paul C. 
Meismer, argued, Missoula, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
DALY, Justice. 
This is an appeal from the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District of the State 
of Montana, in and for the County of Mis-
soula, the Honorable James B. Wheelis pre-
siding. Plaintiffs are the personal repre-
sentatives of the estate of Sammy D. Har-
lan, deceased. They commenced this action 
in District Court to enforce the uninsured 
motorist coverage of an insurance policy 
issued by defendant and appellant, Imple-
ment Dealers Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter IDM), to the plaintiffs' dece-
dent (Harlan). Both parties moved for a 
summary judgment on the issue of the 
availability of uninsured motorist coverage. 
The District Court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs. IDM ap-
peals from the summary judgment and re-
quests that this Court reverse the District 
Court and grant judgment in its favor on 
the basis that there is no coverage available 
in this case. 
Sammy D. Harlan died as a result of a 
motor vehicle accident two and one-half 
miles east of Big Timber, Montana, on June 
20, 1978, when the 1974 Peterbilt tractor-
trailer unit which he owned and was driv-
ing was involved in a collision with a motor 
vehicle driven by Kenneth Heimer. By 
stipulation of counsel, Heimer is deemed to 
be at fault in Sammy D. Harlan's death. 
Heimer had no liability insurance coverage 
at the time of the accident. 
Harlan had purchased a policy of automo-
bile liability insurance from IDM on a 1971 
Ford pickup truck which he owned. This 
policy provided for uninsured motorist cov-
erage in the amount of $25,000. The policy 
of insurance issued by IDM on the Ford 
pickup truck contained an exclusion which 
read: 
"This policy does not apply under Part 
IV: 
"(a) to bodily injury to an insured while 
occupying an automobile (other than an 
910 Mont. 640 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
insured automobile) owned by the named 
insured or a relative, or through being 
struck by such an automobile . . . " 
Montana's mandatory uninsured motorist 
coverage statute, section 33-23-201, MCA, 
requires all motor vehicle liability insurance 
policies issued in this state to include unin-
sured motorist coverage unless the named 
insured rejects such coverage. 
The statute in question, section 33-23-
201, MCA, provides: 
"Motor vehicle liability policies to include 
uninsured motorist coverage—rejection 
by insured. (1) No automobile liability or 
motor vehicle liability policy insuring 
against loss resulting from liability im-
posed by law for bodily injury or death 
suffered by any person arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a mo-
tor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for 
delivery in this state, with respect to any 
motor vehicle registered or principally ga-
raged in this state, unless coverage is 
provided therein or supplemental thereto, 
in limits for bodily injury or death set 
forth in 61-6-103, under provisions filed 
with and approved by the commissioner, 
for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to 
recover damages from owners or opera-
tors of uninsured motor vehicles because 
of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, in-
cluding death, resulting therefrom. 
"(2) The named insured shall have the 
right to reject such coverage. Unless the 
named insured requests such coverage in 
writing, such coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to a renewal 
policy where the named insured had re-
jected the coverage in connection with 
the policy previously issued to him by the 
same insurer." 
[1] One issue is presented to this Court 
otr-appeal: Did the District Court e r r ^ 
holdftfg^Eat the insurance policy's exclusion 
(a) wariaot a permissible limitation un«l8P 
Appellant contends exclusion (a) is not 
invalidated by section 33-23-201, MCA. 
More specifically, appellant argues that be-
cause there is no express provision in the 
statute which prohibits this type of exclu-
sion, it is thereby va id. Further, it is ar-
gued that if the legislature wished to pro-
scribe this type of exclusion, it would have 
done so. Finally, appellant contends that in 
the interest of public policy, the exclusion 
should be held to be v^lid. 
While it is true thlpit courts in several 
states have upheld the (validity of exclusion 
clauses similar to exclusion (a), the majority 
of courts have held similar exclusion clauses 
are in conflict with the uninsured motorist 
statutes. See, State Farm Automobile In-
surance Co. v. Reaves (|1974), 292 Ala. 218, 
292 So.2d 95; Mullis v.\state Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d 
229; Bass v. State Farm\Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
(1973), 128 Ga.App. 285, 196 S.E.2d 485, 
modified, 231 Ga. 269, 201 S.E.2d 444; Dox-
tater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile In-
surance Co. (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 547, 290 
N.E.2d 284; State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Ins. Co. v. Robertson (1973), 156 Ind. 
App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626;| Cannon v. Amer-
ican Underwriters, Inc. (1J971), 150 Ind.App. 
21, 275 N.E.2d 567; EUedge v. Warren (La. 
App.1972), 263 So.2d 912; ~Nygaard v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1974), 
301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151; State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Ins.\ Co. v. Hinkel 
(1971), 87 Nev. 478, 488 I^ .2d 1151; Bell v. 
State Farm Mut Auto. Im. Co. (1974), 157 
W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147; Widiss, A Guide 
To Uninsured Motorist Coverage, § 2.9 at 
31 (1981). 
The^diSHSt^ora^u^ of 
exclusion clauses do so on the ground^that 
if a statute is silent there ii no reaSftf to 
prevent t h e * ^ ttjpthe 
insurer.^ Widiss, supra, at 3Q; see also, Rod-
riquez v. Maryland Indemnity Insurance 
Co. (1975), 24 Ariz.App. 391 539 P.2d 196; 
Barton v. American Family Mutual Insur-
ance Co. (Mo.App.1972), 485 S.W.2d 628. 
Regardless of this rationale, this Govt 
elects to follow the majority! position. 
There are two ecpr^ Uy mmiSTpmiSSm 
adopted by the majority of co^rts-hokimg> 
this type of exclusion ciause to be invalid. 
First, the eicffisiicmarjr dmusj is ineffWtive 
because it tracer the scope of coverage 
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required by the statutory mandate. Mullis 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Co. (Fla.1971), 252 So.2d 229; ^Allstate 
Insurance Company v. Meeks (1967), 207 
Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222; Federated Ameri-
can Ins/Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d 
439, 563 P.2d 815. In Mullis, the court 
stated: 
"The public policy of the uninsured mo-
torist statute (Section 627.0851) is to pro-
vide uniform and specific insurance bene-
fits to members of the public to cover 
damages for bodily injury caused by the 
negligence of insolvent or uninsured mo-
torists and such statutorily fixed and pre-
scribed protection is not reducible by in-
surers' policy exclusions and exceptions 
any more than are the benefits provided 
for persons protected by automobile lia-
bility insurance secured in compliance 
with the Financial Responsibility Law. 
"Insurers or carriers writing automobile 
liability insurance and reciprocal unin-
sured motorist insurance are not permit-
ted by law to insert provisions in the 
policies they issue that exclude or reduce 
the liability coverage prescribed by law 
for the class of persons insured thereun-
der who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of mo-
tor vehicles because of bodily injury." 
252 So.2d at 233-234. 
The second, and equally sound, rational^ 
is that the clause is contrary to the public 
policy embodied in the statut^ Phillips v. 
Midwest Mutual Insurance Company (1971), 
329 F.Supp. 853. The policy behind th(* 
statute is to protect the policyholders from 
uninsured motorists in all instances. $ 
In this case, when exclusion (a) is ana-
lyzed under either or both of the above 
rationales, it is clear that the exclusion is ay 
violation of public policy and Montana in-
surance law, and that it tries to limit t 
scope of coverage mandated by section 3: 
23-201, MCA.* 
Appellant alleges that there is a connec-
tion between the automobile which is in-
sured and the uninsured motorist coverage. 
It is contended that the connection is based 
upon the additional risk which the insur-
ance company incurs by the operation of 
the insured vehicle. Also, it is contended 
that the risk of a party being injured by an 
uninsured motorist increases when a person 
is operating a motor vehicle. Therefore, 
appellant concludes that an insurer must 
attempt to exclude from its coverage any 
activity involving a risk for which it cannot 
collect a premium or for which the premium 
cannot be calculated. 
The arguments made by appellant may 
be true, and they are certainly reflective of 
sound business judgment. However, they 
fail to address the underlying purpose and 
scope of the uninsured motorist statute. 
The court in Elledge v. Warren (La.App. 
1972), 263 So.2d 912, when discussing the 
purpose of its uninsured motorist statute, 
stated: 
"The purpose of the statute is to protect 
completely, those willing to accept its 
protection, from all harm, whatever their 
status—passenger, driver, pedestrian—at 
the time of injury, produced by uninsured 
motorists. The only restrictions are that 
the plaintiff must be an insured, the de-
fendant motorist uninsured, and that 
plaintiff be legally entitled to recover. 
We will not enlarge upon these qualifica-
tions and restrict the coverage of such a 
socially desirable policy by allowing insur-
ance companies to pursue alleged 'busi-
ness interests.' 
" . . . An insurance company may not cre-
ate irrational and illusory 'business inter-
ests' and interpose them as a bar to the 
comprehensive coverage required by our 
statute." 263 So.2d at 918-919. 
Appellant's argument that premiums foi | 
uninsured motorist coverage are somehow 
risk-related is unfounded. The type of pr^ 
mium charged for uninsured motorist pro-
tection illustrates the coverage afforded 
*,The rate is a flat rate, and coverage is 
available to everyone at the same rate? 
? The rate is not related to risk.' In this 
instance, the fact that Harlan had pur-
chased uninsured motorist coverage for only 
one vehicle and paid a premium on this 
vehicle does not give rise to the exclusion of 
coverage on any other owned vehicles. In 
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other words, the importance or value of the 
imputed business purpose for this exclusion 
seems tenuous as applied to the purchaser 
who owns more than one vehicle. Acquisi-
tion of insurance for a second vehicle, espe-
cially with premiums that are not risk-relat-
ed, is relatively inexpensive; therefore, per-
mitting the insurer to withhold coverage 
for the small return seems of dubious merit. 
Widiss, supra, § 2.9 at 29. 
There is no requirement that the insured 
be occupying an insured vehicle. There-
fore, there is no connection between the 
insured and the automobile listed on the 
policy. The named automobile merely illus-
trates that the person has satisfied the legal 
requirement of purchasing insurance and 
has uninsured motorist coverage unless ex-
pressly waived. Montana's uninsured mo-
torist coverage is personal and portable. 
This point was exemplified by the court in 
Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (1980), 409 
Mich. 1, 294 N.W.2d 141, when it held: 
"We conclude that once uninsured motor-
ist coverage is purchased, the insured and 
his relatives insured for liability have un-
insured motorist protection under all cir-
cumstances. Uninsured motorist cover-
age, like no-fault coverage, is personal 
and portable. 
" . . They are insured when injured in an 
owned vehicle named in the policy, in an 
owned,vehicle not named in the policy, in 
an unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a 
bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or 
even on a pogo stick/' 294 N.W.2d at 
152. 
[2,3] It must be emphasized that all 
vaivers of uninsured motorist coverage are 
lot improper. The waiver must be ex-
pressed by the insured in a manner that is 
lear, concise and equitable to both parties 
lvolved in the insurance contract. The 
xclusion clause in question in this case does 
ot satisfy this requirement. The Wash-
igton Supreme Court, in Federated Ameri-
in Ins. Co. v. Raynes (1977), 88 Wash.2d 
19, 563 P.2d 815, when discussing an exclu-
m clause similar to that presented here, 
ated: 
". . . R.C.W. 48.22.030 mandates unin-
sured motorist coverage 'for the protec-
tion of persons insured* under the policy, 
unless the named insured rejects such 
coverage . . . the parties may agree to a 
narrow definition of insured so long as 
that definition is applied consistently 
throughout the policy, but once it is de-
termined that a person is ^n insured un-
der the policy, that person is entitled to 
uninsured motorist coverage. Respon-
dent is a named insured in if.A.I.'s policy. 
Exclusion (b) does not narrdw the defini-
tion of insured so as to exclude from 
being an insured under the policy. Rath-
er, the exclusion merely excludes cover-
age when the insured is injured in a 
certain situation, i.e., occupying a car 
owned by him but not insurjed by F.A.I. 
This attempt to exclude coverage for an 
insured is impermissible under R.C.W. 
48.22.030." 563 P.2d at 818. 
See also, Chaffee v. USF&G\ (1979), 181 
Mont. 1, 591 P.2d 1102, 36 St.Rep. 398. 
The exclusion clause in the IlpM policy is 
lost in the myriad of verbiage | that makes 
up the insurance contract. Thi^ particular 
exclusion clause would be unnckticeable by 
the average policyholder and can, therefore, 
never constitute an express waiver. 
The judgment of the District Court 
affirmed. 
is 
HASWELL, C. J., and HARRISON, 
SHEA, SHEEHY, MORRISON (and WEB-
ER, J J., concur. 
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